  Linux Security HOWTO
  Kevin Fenzi, kevin@tummy.com & Dave Wreski, dave@linuxsecu-
  rity.com
  v1.1.1, 17 March 2000

  This document is a general overview of security issues that face the
  administrator of Linux systems. It covers general security philosophy
  and a number of specific examples of how to better secure your Linux
  system from intruders. Also included are pointers to security-related
  material and programs. Improvements, constructive criticism, additions
  and corrections are gratefully accepted. Please mail your feedback to
  both authors, with "Security HOWTO" in the subject.
  ______________________________________________________________________

  Table of Contents



  1. Introduction

     1.1 New Versions of this Document
     1.2 Feedback
     1.3 Disclaimer
     1.4 Copyright Information

  2. Overview

     2.1 Why Do We Need Security?
     2.2 How Secure Is Secure?
     2.3 What Are You Trying to Protect?
     2.4 Developing A Security Policy
     2.5 Means of Securing Your Site
        2.5.1 Host Security
        2.5.2 Local Network Security
        2.5.3 Security Through Obscurity
     2.6 Organization of This Document

  3. Physical Security

     3.1 Computer locks
     3.2 BIOS Security
     3.3 Boot Loader Security
     3.4 xlock and vlock
     3.5 Detecting Physical Security Compromises

  4. Local Security

     4.1 Creating New Accounts
     4.2 Root Security

  5. Files and Filesystem Security

     5.1 Umask Settings
     5.2 File Permissions
     5.3 Integrity Checking
     5.4 Trojan Horses

  6. Password Security and Encryption

     6.1 PGP and Public-Key Cryptography
     6.2 SSL, S-HTTP, HTTPS and S/MIME
     6.3 Linux IPSEC Implementations
     6.4 (TT
     6.5 PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules
     6.6 Cryptographic IP Encapsulation (CIPE)
     6.7 Kerberos
     6.8 Shadow Passwords.
     6.9 "Crack" and "John the Ripper"
     6.10 CFS - Cryptographic File System and TCFS - Transparent Cryptographic File System
     6.11 X11, SVGA and display security
        6.11.1 X11
        6.11.2 SVGA
        6.11.3 GGI (Generic Graphics Interface project)

  7. Kernel Security

     7.1 2.0 Kernel Compile Options
     7.2 2.2 Kernel Compile Options
     7.3 Kernel Devices

  8. Network Security

     8.1 Packet Sniffers
     8.2 System services and tcp_wrappers
     8.3 Verify Your DNS Information
     8.4 (TT
     8.5 SATAN, ISS, and Other Network Scanners
        8.5.1 Detecting Port Scans
     8.6 (TT
     8.7 Denial of Service Attacks
     8.8 NFS (Network File System) Security.
     8.9 NIS (Network Information Service) (formerly YP).
     8.10 Firewalls
     8.11 IP Chains - Linux Kernel 2.2.x Firewalling
     8.12 VPNs - Virtual Private Networks

  9. Security Preparation (before you go on-line)

     9.1 Make a Full Backup of Your Machine
     9.2 Choosing a Good Backup Schedule
     9.3 Backup Your RPM or Debian File Database
     9.4 Keep Track of Your System Accounting Data
     9.5 Apply All New System Updates.

  10. What To Do During and After a Breakin

     10.1 Security Compromise Underway.
     10.2 Security Compromise has already happened
        10.2.1 Closing the Hole
        10.2.2 Assessing the Damage
        10.2.3 Backups, Backups, Backups!
        10.2.4 Tracking Down the Intruder.

  11. Security Sources

     11.1 FTP Sites
     11.2 Web Sites
     11.3 Mailing Lists
     11.4 Books - Printed Reading Material

  12. Glossary

  13. Frequently Asked Questions

  14. Conclusion

  15. Acknowledgements



  ______________________________________________________________________



  1.  Introduction

  This document covers some of the main issues that affect Linux
  security. General philosophy and net-born resources are discussed.

  A number of other HOWTO documents overlap with security issues, and
  those documents have been pointed to wherever appropriate.

  This document is not meant to be a up-to-date exploits document. Large
  numbers of new exploits happen all the time. This document will tell
  you where to look for such up-to-date information, and will give some
  general methods to prevent such exploits from taking place.



  1.1.  New Versions of this Document

  New versions of this document will be periodically posted to
  comp.os.linux.answers.  They will also be added to the various sites
  that archive such information, including:

  http://www.linuxdoc.org/

  In addition, you should generally be able to find this document on the
  Linux World Wide Web home page via:

  http://metalab.unc.edu/mdw/linux.html

  Finally, the very latest version of this document should also be
  available in various formats from:

  http://scrye.com/~kevin/lsh/

  or

  http://www.linuxsecurity.com/Security-HOWTO

  or

  http://www.tummy.com/security-howto



  1.2.  Feedback

  All comments, error reports, additional information and criticism of
  all sorts should be directed to:

  kevin@tummy.com

  and

  dave@linuxsecurity.com

  Note: Please send your feedback to both authors. Also, be sure and
  include "Linux" "security", or "HOWTO" in your subject to avoid
  Kevin's spam filter.


  1.3.  Disclaimer

  No liability for the contents of this document can be accepted.  Use
  the concepts, examples and other content at your own risk.
  Additionally, this is an early version, possibly with many
  inaccuracies or errors.

  A number of the examples and descriptions use the RedHat(tm) package
  layout and system setup. Your mileage may vary.

  As far as we know, only programs that, under certain terms may be used
  or evaluated for personal purposes will be described. Most of the
  programs will be available, complete with source, under GNU
  <http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html> terms.


  1.4.  Copyright Information

  This document is copyrighted (c)1998-2000 Kevin Fenzi and Dave Wreski,
  and distributed under the following terms:


  o  Linux HOWTO documents may be reproduced and distributed in whole or
     in part, in any medium, physical or electronic, as long as this
     copyright notice is retained on all copies. Commercial
     redistribution is allowed and encouraged; however, the authors
     would like to be notified of any such distributions.

  o  All translations, derivative works, or aggregate works
     incorporating any Linux HOWTO documents must be covered under this
     copyright notice.  That is, you may not produce a derivative work
     from a HOWTO and impose additional restrictions on its
     distribution. Exceptions to these rules may be granted under
     certain conditions; please contact the Linux HOWTO coordinator at
     the address given below.

  o  If you have questions, please contact Tim Bynum, the Linux HOWTO
     coordinator, at

  tjbynum@metalab.unc.edu


  2.  Overview

  This document will attempt to explain some procedures and commonly-
  used software to help your Linux system be more secure.  It is
  important to discuss some of the basic concepts first, and create a
  security foundation, before we get started.

  2.1.  Why Do We Need Security?

  In the ever-changing world of global data communications, inexpensive
  Internet connections, and fast-paced software development, security is
  becoming more and more of an issue.  Security is now a basic
  requirement because global computing is inherently insecure.  As your
  data goes from point A to point B on the Internet, for example, it may
  pass through several other points along the way, giving other users
  the opportunity to intercept, and even alter, it.  Even other users on
  your system may maliciously transform your data into something you did
  not intend.  Unauthorized access to your system may be obtained by
  intruders, also known as "crackers", who then use advanced knowledge
  to impersonate you, steal information from you, or even deny you
  access to your own resources.  If you're wondering what the difference
  is between a "Hacker" and a "Cracker", see Eric Raymond's document,
  "How to Become A Hacker", available at
  http://www.netaxs.com/~esr/faqs/hacker-howto.html.


  2.2.  How Secure Is Secure?

  First, keep in mind that no computer system can ever be completely
  secure. All you can do is make it increasingly difficult for someone
  to compromise your system. For the average home Linux user, not much
  is required to keep the casual cracker at bay. However, for high-
  profile Linux users (banks, telecommunications companies, etc), much
  more work is required.

  Another factor to take into account is that the more secure your
  system is, the more intrusive your security becomes. You need to
  decide where in this balancing act your system will still usable, and
  yet secure for your purposes. For instance, you could require everyone
  dialing into your system to use a call-back modem to call them back at
  their home number. This is more secure, but if someone is not at home,
  it makes it difficult for them to login. You could also setup your
  Linux system with no network or connection to the Internet, but this
  limits its usefulness.


  If you are a medium to large-sized site, you should establish a
  security policy stating how much security is required by your site and
  what auditing is in place to check it. You can find a well-known
  security policy example at http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2196.html.  It
  has been recently updated, and contains a great framework for
  establishing a security policy for your company.



  2.3.  What Are You Trying to Protect?

  Before you attempt to secure your system, you should determine what
  level of threat you have to protect against, what risks you should or
  should not take, and how vulnerable your system is as a result.  You
  should analyze your system to know what you're protecting, why you're
  protecting it, what value it has, and who has responsibility for your
  data and other assets.


  o  Risk is the possibility that an intruder may be successful in
     attempting to access your computer.  Can an intruder read or write
     files, or execute programs that could cause damage?  Can they
     delete critical data? Can they prevent you or your company from
     getting important work done? Don't forget: someone gaining access
     to your account, or your system, can also impersonate you.

     Additionally, having one insecure account on your system can result
     in your entire network being compromised.  If you allow a single
     user to login using a .rhosts file, or to use an insecure service
     such as tftp, you risk an intruder getting 'his foot in the door'.
     Once the intruder has a user account on your system, or someone
     else's system, it can be used to gain access to another system, or
     another account.


  o  Threat is typically from someone with motivation to gain
     unauthorized access to your network or computer.  You must decide
     whom you trust to have access to your system, and what threat they
     could pose.

     There are several types of intruders, and it is useful to keep
     their different characteristics in mind as you are securing your
     systems.


  o  The Curious - This type of intruder is basically interested in
     finding out what type of system and data you have.

  o  The Malicious - This type of intruder is out to either bring down
     your systems, or deface your web page, or otherwise force you to
     spend time and money recovering from the damage he has caused.

  o  The High-Profile Intruder - This type of intruder is trying to use
     your system to gain popularity and infamy.  He might use your high-
     profile system to advertise his abilities.

  o  The Competition - This type of intruder is interested in what data
     you have on your system.  It might be someone who thinks you have
     something that could benefit him, financially or otherwise.

  o  The Borrowers - This type of intruder is interested in setting up
     shop on your system and using its resources for their own purposes.
     He typically will run chat or irc servers, porn archive sites, or
     even DNS servers.


  o  The Leapfrogger - This type of intruder is only interested in your
     system to use it to get into other systems. If your system is well-
     connected or a gateway to a number of internal hosts, you may well
     see this type trying to compromise your system.


  o  Vulnerability describes how well-protected your computer is from
     another network, and the potential for someone to gain unauthorized
     access.

     What's at stake if someone breaks into your system?  Of course the
     concerns of a dynamic PPP home user will be different from those of
     a company connecting their machine to the Internet, or another
     large network.

     How much time would it take to retrieve/recreate any data that was
     lost?  An initial time investment now can save ten times more time
     later if you have to recreate data that was lost.  Have you checked
     your backup strategy, and verified your data lately?


  2.4.  Developing A Security Policy

  Create a simple, generic policy for your system that your users can
  readily understand and follow.  It should protect the data you're
  safeguarding as well as the privacy of the users.  Some things to
  consider adding are: who has access to the system (Can my friend use
  my account?), who's allowed to install software on the system, who
  owns what data, disaster recovery, and appropriate use of the system.

  A generally-accepted security policy starts with the phrase


                    That which is not permitted is prohibited


  This means that unless you grant access to a service for a user, that
  user shouldn't be using that service until you do grant access. Make
  sure the policies work on your regular user account. Saying, "Ah, I
  can't figure out this permissions problem, I'll just do it as root"
  can lead to security holes that are very obvious, and even ones that
  haven't been exploited yet.

  rfc1244 is a document that describes how to create your own network
  security policy.

  rfc1281 is a document that shows an example security policy with
  detailed descriptions of each step.

  Finally, you might want to look at the COAST policy archive at
  ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/doc/policy to see what some real-life
  security policies look like.


  2.5.  Means of Securing Your Site

  This document will discuss various means with which you can secure the
  assets you have worked hard for: your local machine, your data, your
  users, your network, even your reputation.  What would happen to your
  reputation if an intruder deleted some of your users' data?  Or
  defaced your web site?  Or published your company's corporate project
  plan for next quarter?  If you are planning a network installation,
  there are many factors you must take into account before adding a
  single machine to your network.


  Even if you have a single dialup PPP account, or just a small site,
  this does not mean intruders won't be interested in your systems.
  Large, high-profile sites are not the only targets -- many intruders
  simply want to exploit as many sites as possible, regardless of their
  size. Additionally, they may use a security hole in your site to gain
  access to other sites you're connected to.

  Intruders have a lot of time on their hands, and can avoid guessing
  how you've obscured your system just by trying all the possibilities.
  There are also a number of reasons an intruder may be interested in
  your systems, which we will discuss later.



  2.5.1.  Host Security

  Perhaps the area of security on which administrators concentrate most
  is host-based security.  This typically involves making sure your own
  system is secure, and hoping everyone else on your network does the
  same.  Choosing good passwords, securing your host's local network
  services, keeping good accounting records, and upgrading programs with
  known security exploits are among the things the local security
  administrator is responsible for doing.  Although this is absolutely
  necessary, it can become a daunting task once your network becomes
  larger than a few machines.


  2.5.2.  Local Network Security

  Network security is as necessary as local host security.  With
  hundreds, thousands, or more computers on the same network, you can't
  rely on each one of those systems being secure.  Ensuring that only
  authorized users can use your network, building firewalls, using
  strong encryption, and ensuring there are no "rogue" (that is,
  unsecured) machines on your network are all part of the network
  security administrator's duties.

  This document will discuss some of the techniques used to secure your
  site, and hopefully show you some of the ways to prevent an intruder
  from gaining access to what you are trying to protect.


  2.5.3.  Security Through Obscurity


  One type of security that must be discussed is "security through
  obscurity". This means, for example, moving a service that has known
  security vunerabilities to a non-standard port in hopes that attackers
  won't notice it's there and thus won't exploit it. Rest assured that
  they can determine that it's there and will exploit it. Security
  through obscurity is no security at all. Simply because you may have a
  small site, or a relatively low profile, does not mean an intruder
  won't be interested in what you have.  We'll discuss what you're
  protecting in the next sections.


  2.6.  Organization of This Document

  This document has been divided into a number of sections. They cover
  several broad security issues. The first, ``Physical Security'',
  covers how you need to protect your physical machine from tampering.
  The second, ``Local Security'', describes how to protect your system
  from tampering by local users. The third, ``Files and Filesystem
  Security'', shows you how to setup your filesystems and permissions on
  your files. The next, ``Password Security  and Encryption'', discusses
  how to use encryption to better secure your machine and network.
  ``Kernel Security'' discusses what kernel options you should set or be
  aware of for a more secure system.  ``Network Security'', describes
  how to better secure your Linux system from network attacks.
  ``Security Preparation'', discusses how to prepare your machine(s)
  before bringing them on-line. Next, ``What To Do During and After a
  Break-in'', discusses what to do when you detect a system compromise
  in progress or detect one that has recently happened. In ``Security
  Resources'', some primary security resources are enumerated.  The Q
  and A section ``Frequently Asked Questions'', answers some frequently-
  asked questions, and finally a conclusion in ``Conclusion''.

  The two main points to realize when reading this document are:


  o  Be aware of your system. Check system logs such as
     /var/log/messages and keep an eye on your system, and

  o  Keep your system up-to-date by making sure you have installed the
     current versions of software and have upgraded per security alerts.
     Just doing this will help make your system markedly more secure.


  3.  Physical Security

  The first layer of security you need to take into account is the
  physical security of your computer systems. Who has direct physical
  access to your machine? Should they? Can you protect your machine from
  their tampering? Should you?

  How much physical security you need on your system is very dependent
  on your situation, and/or budget.

  If you are a home user, you probably don't need a lot (although you
  might need to protect your machine from tampering by children or
  annoying relatives).  If you are in a lab, you need considerably more,
  but users will still need to be able to get work done on the machines.
  Many of the following sections will help out. If you are in an office,
  you may or may not need to secure your machine off-hours or while you
  are away. At some companies, leaving your console unsecured is a
  termination offense.

  Obvious physical security methods such as locks on doors, cables,
  locked cabinets, and video surveillance are all good ideas, but beyond
  the scope of this document. :)


  3.1.  Computer locks

  Many modern PC cases include a "locking" feature. Usually this will be
  a socket on the front of the case that allows you to turn an included
  key to a locked or unlocked position. Case locks can help prevent
  someone from stealing your PC, or opening up the case and directly
  manipulating/stealing your hardware. They can also sometimes prevent
  someone from rebooting your computer from their own floppy or other
  hardware.

  These case locks do different things according to the support in the
  motherboard and how the case is constructed. On many PC's they make it
  so you have to break the case to get the case open. On some others,
  they will not let you plug in new keyboards or mice. Check your
  motherboard or case instructions for more information. This can
  sometimes be a very useful feature, even though the locks are usually
  very low-quality and can easily be defeated by attackers with
  locksmithing.


  Some machines (most notably SPARCs and macs) have a dongle on the back
  that, if you put a cable through, attackers would have to cut the
  cable or break the case to get into it. Just putting a padlock or
  combo lock through these can be a good deterrent to someone stealing
  your machine.



  3.2.  BIOS Security

  The BIOS is the lowest level of software that configures or
  manipulates your x86-based hardware. LILO and other Linux boot methods
  access the BIOS to determine how to boot up your Linux machine. Other
  hardware that Linux runs on has similar software (OpenFirmware on Macs
  and new Suns, Sun boot PROM, etc...). You can use your BIOS to prevent
  attackers from rebooting your machine and manipulating your Linux
  system.

  Many PC BIOSs let you set a boot password. This doesn't provide all
  that much security (the BIOS can be reset, or removed if someone can
  get into the case), but might be a good deterrent (i.e. it will take
  time and leave traces of tampering). Similarly, on S/Linux (Linux for
  SPARC(tm) processor machines), your EEPROM can be set to require a
  boot-up password. This might slow attackers down.

  Many x86 BIOSs also allow you to specify various other good security
  settings. Check your BIOS manual or look at it the next time you boot
  up. For example, some BIOSs disallow booting from floppy drives and
  some require passwords to access some BIOS features.

  Note: If you have a server machine, and you set up a boot password,
  your machine will not boot up unattended. Keep in mind that you will
  need to come in and supply the password in the event of a power
  failure. ;(


  3.3.  Boot Loader Security

  The various Linux boot loaders also can have a boot password set.
  LILO, for example, has password and restricted settings; password
  requires password at boot time, whereas restricted requires a boot-
  time password only if you specify options (such as single) at the LILO
  prompt.

  From the lilo.conf man page:


       password=password
                     The per-image option `password=...' (see below) applies to all images.

       restricted
                     The per-image option `restricted' (see below) applies to all images.

              password=password
                     Protect the image by a password.

              restricted
                     A password is only required to boot the image if
                     parameters are specified  on  the  command  line
                     (e.g. single).



  Keep in mind when setting all these passwords that you need to
  remember them. :) Also remember that these passwords will merely slow
  the determined attacker.  They won't prevent someone from booting from
  a floppy, and mounting your root partition.  If you are using security
  in conjunction with a boot loader, you might as well disable booting
  from a floppy in your computer's BIOS, and password-protect the BIOS.

  If anyone has security-related information from a different boot
  loader, we would love to hear it. (grub, silo, milo, linload, etc).

  Note: If you have a server machine, and you set up a boot password,
  your machine will not boot up unattended. Keep in mind that you will
  need to come in and supply the password in the event of a power
  failure. ;(


  3.4.  xlock and vlock

  If you wander away from your machine from time to time, it is nice to
  be able to "lock" your console so that no one can tamper with, or look
  at, your work. Two programs that do this are: xlock and vlock.

  xlock is a X display locker. It should be included in any Linux
  distributions that support X. Check out the man page for it for more
  options, but in general you can run xlock from any xterm on your
  console and it will lock the display and require your password to
  unlock.

  vlock is a simple little program that allows you to lock some or all
  of the virtual consoles on your Linux box. You can lock just the one
  you are working in or all of them. If you just lock one, others can
  come in and use the console; they will just not be able to use your
  virtual console until you unlock it. vlock ships with redhat Linux,
  but your mileage may vary.

  Of course locking your console will prevent someone from tampering
  with your work, but won't prevent them from rebooting your machine or
  otherwise disrupting your work. It also does not prevent them from
  accessing your machine from another machine on the network and causing
  problems.

  More importantly, it does not prevent someone from switching out of
  the X Window System entirely, and going to a normal virtual console
  login prompt, or to the VC that X11 was started from, and suspending
  it, thus obtaining your privileges.  For this reason, you might
  consider only using it while under control of xdm.


  3.5.  Detecting Physical Security Compromises

  The first thing to always note is when your machine was rebooted.
  Since Linux is a robust and stable OS, the only times your machine
  should reboot is when you take it down for OS upgrades, hardware
  swapping, or the like. If your machine has rebooted without you doing
  it, that may be a sign that an intruder has compromised it. Many of
  the ways that your machine can be compromised require the intruder to
  reboot or power off your machine.

  Check for signs of tampering on the case and computer area. Although
  many intruders clean traces of their presence out of logs, it's a good
  idea to check through them all and note any discrepancy.

  It is also a good idea to store log data at a secure location, such as
  a dedicated log server within your well-protected network.  Once a
  machine has been compromised, log data becomes of little use as it
  most likely has also been modified by the intruder.


  The syslog daemon can be configured to automatically send log data to
  a central syslog server, but this is typically sent unencrypted,
  allowing an intruder to view data as it is being transferred.  This
  may reveal information about your network that is not intended to be
  public.  There are syslog daemons available that encrypt the data as
  it is being sent.

  Also be aware that faking syslog messages is easy -- with an exploit
  program having been published.  Syslog even accepts net log entries
  claiming to come from the local host without indicating their true
  origin.

  Some things to check for in your logs:

  o  Short or incomplete logs.

  o  Logs containing strange timestamps.

  o  Logs with incorrect permissions or ownership.

  o  Records of reboots or restarting of services.

  o  missing logs.

  o  su entries or logins from strange places.

  We will discuss system log data ``later'' in the HOWTO.


  4.  Local Security

  The next thing to take a look at is the security in your system
  against attacks from local users. Did we just say local users? Yes!

  Getting access to a local user account is one of the first things that
  system intruders attempt while on their way to exploiting the root
  account. With lax local security, they can then "upgrade" their normal
  user access to root access using a variety of bugs and poorly setup
  local services. If you make sure your local security is tight, then
  the intruder will have another hurdle to jump.

  Local users can also cause a lot of havoc with your system even
  (especially) if they really are who they say they are. Providing
  accounts to people you don't know or for whom you have no contact
  information is a very bad idea.


  4.1.  Creating New Accounts

  You should make sure you provide user accounts with only the minimal
  requirements for the task they need to do. If you provide your son
  (age 10) with an account, you might want him to only have access to a
  word processor or drawing program, but be unable to delete data that
  is not his.

  Several good rules of thumb when allowing other people legitimate
  access to your Linux machine:


  o  Give them the minimal amount of privileges they need.

  o  Be aware when/where they login from, or should be logging in from.

  o  Make sure you remove inactive accounts


  o  The use of the same userid on all computers and networks is
     advisable to ease account maintence, and permits easier analysis of
     log data.

  o  The creation of group userid's should be absolutely prohibited.
     User accounts also provide accountability, and this is not possible
     with group accounts.

  Many local user accounts that are used in security compromises have
  not been used in months or years. Since no one is using them they,
  provide the ideal attack vehicle.


  4.2.  Root Security

  The most sought-after account on your machine is the root (superuser)
  account.  This account has authority over the entire machine, which
  may also include authority over other machines on the network.
  Remember that you should only use the root account for very short,
  specific tasks, and should mostly run as a normal user. Even small
  mistakes made while logged in as the root user can cause problems. The
  less time you are on with root privileges, the safer you will be.

  Several tricks to avoid messing up your own box as root:

  o  When doing some complex command, try running it first in a non-
     destructive way...especially commands that use globbing: e.g., if
     you want to do rm foo*.bak, first do ls foo*.bak and make sure you
     are going to delete the files you think you are. Using echo in
     place of destructive commands also sometimes works.

  o  Provide your users with a default alias to the rm command to ask
     for confirmation for deletion of files.

  o   Only become root to do single specific tasks. If you find yourself
     trying to figure out how to do something, go back to a normal user
     shell until you are sure what needs to be done by root.

  o  The command path for the root user is very important.  The command
     path (that is, the PATH environment variable) specifies the
     directories in which the shell searches for programs.  Try to limit
     the command path for the root user as much as possible, and never
     include . (which means "the current directory") in your PATH.
     Additionally, never have writable directories in your search path,
     as this can allow attackers to modify or place new binaries in your
     search path, allowing them to run as root the next time you run
     that command.

  o  Never use the rlogin/rsh/rexec suite of tools (called the r-
     utilities) as root. They are subject to many sorts of attacks, and
     are downright dangerous when run as root. Never create a .rhosts
     file for root.

  o  The /etc/securetty file contains a list of terminals that root can
     login from. By default (on Red Hat Linux) this is set to only the
     local virtual consoles(vtys). Be very wary of adding anything else
     to this file. You should be able to login remotely as your regular
     user account and then su if you need to (hopefully over ``ssh'' or
     other encrypted channel), so there is no need to be able to login
     directly as root.

  o  Always be slow and deliberate running as root. Your actions could
     affect a lot of things. Think before you type!

  If you absolutely positively need to allow someone (hopefully very
  trusted) to have root access to your machine, there are a few tools
  that can help. sudo allows users to use their password to access a
  limited set of commands as root. This would allow you to, for
  instance, let a user be able to eject and mount removable media on
  your Linux box, but have no other root privileges. sudo also keeps a
  log of all successful and unsuccessful sudo attempts, allowing you to
  track down who used what command to do what. For this reason sudo
  works well even in places where a number of people have root access,
  because it helps you keep track of changes made.

  Although sudo can be used to give specific users specific privileges
  for specific tasks, it does have several shortcomings. It should be
  used only for a limited set of tasks, like restarting a server, or
  adding new users.  Any program that offers a shell escape will give
  root access to a user invoking it via sudo.  This includes most
  editors, for example.  Also, a program as innocuous as /bin/cat can be
  used to overwrite files, which could allow root to be exploited.
  Consider sudo as a means for accountability, and don't expect it to
  replace the root user and still be secure.


  5.  Files and Filesystem Security

  A few minutes of preparation and planning ahead before putting your
  systems online can help to protect them and the data stored on them.

  o  There should never be a reason for users' home directories to allow
     SUID/SGID programs to be run from there.  Use the nosuid option in
     /etc/fstab for partitions that are writable by others than root.
     You may also wish to use nodev and noexec on users' home
     partitions, as well as /var, thus prohibiting execution of
     programs, and creation of character or block devices, which should
     never be necessary anyway.

  o  If you are exporting filesystems using NFS, be sure to configure
     /etc/exports with the most restrictive access possible.  This means
     not using wildcards, not allowing root write access, and exporting
     read-only wherever possible.

  o  Configure your users' file-creation umask to be as restrictive as
     possible.  See ``umask settings''.

  o  If you are mounting filesystems using a network filesystem such as
     NFS, be sure to configure /etc/exports with suitable restrictions.
     Typically, using `nodev', `nosuid', and perhaps `noexec', are
     desirable.

  o  Set filesystem limits instead of allowing unlimited as is the
     default.  You can control the per-user limits using the resource-
     limits PAM module and /etc/pam.d/limits.conf.  For example, limits
     for group users might look like this:



                       @users     hard  core    0
                       @users     hard  nproc   50
                       @users     hard  rss     5000



  This says to prohibit the creation of core files, restrict the number
  of processes to 50, and restrict memory usage per user to 5M.


  o  The /var/log/wtmp and /var/run/utmp files contain the login records
     for all users on your system.  Their integrity must be maintained
     because they can be used to determine when and from where a user
     (or potential intruder) has entered your system.  These files
     should also have 644 permissions, without affecting normal system
     operation.


  o  The immutable bit can be used to prevent accidentally deleting or
     overwriting a file that must be protected.  It also prevents
     someone from creating a symbolic link to the file (such symbolic
     links have been the source of attacks involving deleting
     /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow).  See the chattr(1) man page for
     information on the immutable bit.


  o   SUID and SGID files on your system are a potential security risk,
     and should be monitored closely.  Because these programs grant
     special privileges to the user who is executing them, it is
     necessary to ensure that insecure programs are not installed.  A
     favorite trick of crackers is to exploit SUID-root programs, then
     leave a SUID program as a backdoor to get in the next time, even if
     the original hole is plugged.

     Find all SUID/SGID programs on your system, and keep track of what
     they are, so you are aware of any changes which could indicate a
     potential intruder.  Use the following command to find all
     SUID/SGID programs on your system:



                       root#  find / -type f \( -perm -04000 -o -perm -02000 \)



  The Debian distribution runs a job each night to determine what SUID
  files exist. It then compares this to the previous night's run. You
  can look in /var/log/setuid* for this log.

  You can remove the SUID or SGID permissions on a suspicious program
  with chmod, then restore them back if you absolutely feel it is
  necessary.


  o  World-writable files, particularly system files, can be a security
     hole if a cracker gains access to your system and modifies them.
     Additionally, world-writable directories are dangerous, since they
     allow a cracker to add or delete files as he wishes.  To locate all
     world-writable files on your system, use the following command:



                       root# find / -perm -2 ! -type l -ls



  and be sure you know why those files are writable.  In the normal
  course of operation, several files will be world-writable, including
  some from /dev, and symbolic links, thus the ! -type l which excludes
  these from the previous find command.

  o

     Unowned files may also be an indication an intruder has accessed
     your system.  You can locate files on your system that have no
     owner, or belong to no group with the command:
                       root# find / -nouser -o -nogroup -print



  o  Finding .rhosts files should be a part of your regular system
     administration duties, as these files should not be permitted on
     your system.  Remember, a cracker only needs one insecure account
     to potentially gain access to your entire network.  You can locate
     all .rhosts files on your system with the following command:


                      root# find /home -name .rhosts -print



  o

     Finally, before changing permissions on any system files, make sure
     you understand what you are doing. Never change permissions on a
     file because it seems like the easy way to get things working.
     Always determine why the file has that permission before changing
     it.


  5.1.  Umask Settings

  The umask command can be used to determine the default file creation
  mode on your system. It is the octal complement of the desired file
  mode. If files are created without any regard to their permissions
  settings, the user could inadvertently give read or write permission
  to someone that should not have this permission. Typical umask
  settings include 022, 027, and 077 (which is the most restrictive).
  Normally the umask is set in /etc/profile, so it applies to all users
  on the system.  The file creation mask can be calculated by
  subtracting the desired value from 777.  In other words, a umask of
  777 would cause newly-created files to contain no read, write or
  execute permission for anyone.  A mask of 666 would cause newly-
  created files to have a mask of 111.  For example, you may have a line
  that looks like this:



                       # Set the user's default umask
                       umask 033



  Be sure to make root's umask 077, which will disable read, write, and
  execute permission for other users, unless explicitly changed using
  chmod.  In this case, newly-created directories would have 744 permis-
  sions, obtained by subtracting 033 from 777.  Newly-created files
  using the 033 umask would have permissions of 644.

  If you are using Red Hat, and adhere to their user and group ID
  creation scheme (User Private Groups), it is only necessary to use 002
  for a umask.  This is due to the fact that the default configuration
  is one user per group.



  5.2.  File Permissions

  It's important to ensure that your system files are not open for
  casual editing by users and groups who shouldn't be doing such system
  maintenance.

  Unix separates access control on files and directories according to
  three characteristics:  owner, group, and other.  There is always
  exactly one owner, any number of members of the group, and everyone
  else.

  A quick explanation of Unix permissions:

  Ownership      - Which user(s) and group(s) retain(s) control of the
  permission settings of the node and parent of the node

  Permissions    - Bits capable of being set or reset to allow certain
  types of access to it.  Permissions for directories may have a
  different meaning than the same set of permissions on files.

  Read:

  o  To be able to view contents of a file

  o  To be able to read a directory

  Write:

  o  To be able to add to or change a file

  o  To be able to delete or move files in a directory

  Execute:

  o  To be able to run a binary program or shell script

  o  To be able to search in a directory, combined with read permission


     Save Text Attribute: (For directories)
        The "sticky bit" also has a different meaning when applied to
        directories than when applied to files.  If the sticky bit is
        set on a directory, then a user may only delete files that the
        he owns or for which he has explicit write permission granted,
        even when he has write access to the directory.  This is
        designed for directories like /tmp, which are world-writable,
        but where it may not be desirable to allow any user to delete
        files at will.  The sticky bit is seen as a t in a long
        directory listing.


     SUID Attribute: (For Files)
        This describes set-user-id permissions on the file.  When the
        set user ID access mode is set in the owner permissions, and the
        file is executable, processes which run it are granted access to
        system resources based on user who owns the file, as opposed to
        the user who created the process. This is the cause of many
        "buffer overflow" exploits.


     SGID Attribute: (For Files)
        If set in the group permissions, this bit controls the "set
        group id" status of a file.  This behaves the same way as SUID,
        except the group is affected instead.  The file must be
        executable for this to have any effect.

     SGID Attribute: (For directories)
        If you set the SGID bit on a directory (with chmod g+s
        directory), files created in that directory will have their
        group set to the directory's group.

  You          - The owner of the file

  Group        - The group you belong to

  Everyone     - Anyone on the system that is not the owner or a member
  of the group


  File Example:



               -rw-r--r--  1 kevin  users         114 Aug 28  1997 .zlogin
               1st bit - directory?             (no)
                2nd bit - read by owner?         (yes, by kevin)
                 3rd bit - write by owner?        (yes, by kevin)
                  4th bit - execute by owner?      (no)
                   5th bit - read by group?         (yes, by users)
                    6th bit - write by group?        (no)
                     7th bit - execute by group?      (no)
                      8th bit - read by everyone?      (yes, by everyone)
                       9th bit - write by everyone?     (no)
                        10th bit - execute by everyone?  (no)



  The following lines are examples of the minimum sets of permissions
  that are required to perform the access described.  You may want to
  give more permission than what's listed here, but this should describe
  what these minimum permissions on files do:



       -r--------  Allow read access to the file by owner
       --w-------  Allows the owner to modify or delete the file
                   (Note that anyone with write permission to the directory
                    the file is in can overwrite it and thus delete it)
       ---x------  The owner can execute this program, but not shell scripts,
                    which still need read permission
       ---s------  Will execute with effective User ID = to owner
       --------s-  Will execute with effective Group ID = to group
       -rw------T  No update of "last modified time".  Usually used for swap
                    files
       ---t------  No effect.  (formerly sticky bit)



  Directory Example:



          drwxr-xr-x  3 kevin  users         512 Sep 19 13:47 .public_html/
          1st bit - directory?             (yes, it contains many files)
           2nd bit - read by owner?         (yes, by kevin)
            3rd bit - write by owner?        (yes, by kevin)
             4th bit - execute by owner?      (yes, by kevin)
              5th bit - read by group?         (yes, by users
               6th bit - write by group?        (no)
                7th bit - execute by group?      (yes, by users)
                 8th bit - read by everyone?      (yes, by everyone)
                  9th bit - write by everyone?     (no)
                   10th bit - execute by everyone?  (yes, by everyone)



  The following lines are examples of the minimum sets of permissions
  that are required to perform the access described.  You may want to
  give more permission than what's listed, but this should describe what
  these minimum permissions on directories do:



       dr--------  The contents can be listed, but file attributes can't be read
       d--x------  The directory can be entered, and used in full execution
                    paths
       dr-x------  File attributes can be read by owner
       d-wx------  Files can be created/deleted, even if the directory
                    isn't the current one
       d------x-t  Prevents files from deletion by others with write
                    access. Used on /tmp
       d---s--s--  No effect



  System configuration files (usually in /etc) are usually mode 640
  (-rw-r-----), and owned by root. Depending on your site's security
  requirements, you might adjust this. Never leave any system files
  writable by a group or everyone.  Some configuration files, including
  /etc/shadow, should only be readable by root, and directories in /etc
  should at least not be accessible by others.


     SUID Shell Scripts
        SUID shell scripts are a serious security risk, and for this
        reason the kernel will not honor them.  Regardless of how secure
        you think the shell script is, it can be exploited to give the
        cracker a root shell.


  5.3.  Integrity Checking

  Another very good way to detect local (and also network) attacks on
  your system is to run an integrity checker like Tripwire, Aide or
  Osiris.  These integrety checkers run a number of checksums on all
  your important binaries and config files and compares them against a
  database of former, known-good values as a reference. Thus, any
  changes in the files will be flagged.

  It's a good idea to install these sorts of programs onto a floppy, and
  then physically set the write protect on the floppy. This way
  intruders can't tamper with the integrety checker itself or change the
  database. Once you have something like this setup, it's a good idea to
  run it as part of your normal security administration duties to see if
  anything has changed.
  You can even add a crontab entry to run the checker from your floppy
  every night and mail you the results in the morning. Something like:


                       # set mailto
                       MAILTO=kevin
                       # run Tripwire
                       15 05 * * * root /usr/local/adm/tcheck/tripwire



  will mail you a report each morning at 5:15am.

  Integrety checkers can be a godsend to detecting intruders before you
  would otherwise notice them. Since a lot of files change on the
  average system, you have to be careful what is cracker activity and
  what is your own doing.

  You can find the open sourced version of Tripwire at
  http://www.tripwire.org, free of charge.  Manuals and support can be
  purchased.

  Aide can be found at http://www.cs.tut.fi/~rammer/aide.html.

  Osiris can be found at http://www.shmoo.com/osiris/.


  5.4.  Trojan Horses

  "Trojan Horses" are named after the fabled ploy in Homer's "Iliad".
  The idea is that a cracker distributes a program or binary that sounds
  great, and encourages other people to download it and run it as root.
  Then the program can compromise their system while they are not paying
  attention. While they think the binary they just pulled down does one
  thing (and it might very well), it also compromises their security.

  You should take care of what programs you install on your machine.
  Redhat provides MD5 checksums and PGP signatures on it's RPM files so
  you can verify you are installing the real thing. Other distributions
  have similar methods. You should never run any unfamiliar binary, for
  which you don't have the source, as root! Few attackers are willing to
  release source code to public scrutiny.

  Although it can be complex, make sure you are getting the source for a
  program from its real distribution site. If the program is going to
  run as root, make sure either you or someone you trust has looked over
  the source and verified it.


  6.  Password Security and Encryption

  One of the most important security features used today are passwords.
  It is important for both you and all your users to have secure,
  unguessable passwords. Most of the more recent Linux distributions
  include passwd programs that do not allow you to set a easily
  guessable password. Make sure your passwd program is up to date and
  has these features.

  In-depth discussion of encryption is beyond the scope of this
  document, but an introduction is in order. Encryption is very useful,
  possibly even necessary in this day and age. There are all sorts of
  methods of encrypting data, each with its own set of characteristics.

  Most Unicies (and Linux is no exception) primarily use a one-way
  encryption algorithm, called DES (Data Encryption Standard) to encrypt
  your passwords. This encrypted password is then stored in (typically)
  /etc/passwd (or less commonly) /etc/shadow. When you attempt to login,
  the password you type in is encrypted again and compared with the
  entry in the file that stores your passwords. If they match, it must
  be the same password, and you are allowed access. Although DES is a
  two-way encryption algorithm (you can code and then decode a message,
  given the right keys), the variant that most unices use is one-way.
  This means that it should not be possible to reverse the encryption to
  get the password from the contents of /etc/passwd (or /etc/shadow).

  Brute force attacks, such as "Crack" or "John the Ripper" (see Section
  ``'') can often guess passwords unless your password is sufficiently
  random. PAM modules (see below) allow you to use a different
  encryption routine with your passwords (MD5 or the like).  You can use
  Crack to your advantage, as well.  Consider periodically running Crack
  against your own password database, to find insecure passwords.  Then
  contact the offending user, and instruct him to change his password.

  You can go to http://consult.cern.ch/writeup/security/security_3.html
  for information on how to choose a good password.


  6.1.  PGP and Public-Key Cryptography


  Public-key cryptography, such as that used for PGP, uses one key for
  encryption, and one key for decryption.  Traditional cryptography,
  however, uses the same key for encryption and decryption; this key
  must be known to both parties, and thus somehow transferred from one
  to the other securely.

  To alleviate the need to securely transmit the encryption key, public-
  key encryption uses two separate keys: a public key and a private key.
  Each person's public key is available by anyone to do the encryption,
  while at the same time each person keeps his or her private key to
  decrypt messages encrypted with the correct public key.

  There are advantages to both public key and private key cryptography,
  and you can read about those differences in the RSA Cryptography FAQ
  <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/newfaq/>, listed at the end of this
  section.

  PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is well-supported on Linux. Versions 2.6.2
  and 5.0 are known to work well. For a good primer on PGP and how to
  use it, take a look at the PGP FAQ:
  http://www.pgp.com/service/export/faq/55faq.cgi

  Be sure to use the version that is applicable to your country. Due to
  export restrictions by the US Government, strong-encryption is
  prohibited from being transferred in electronic form outside the
  country.

  US export controls are now managed by EAR (Export Administration
  Regulations).  They are no longer governed by ITAR.

  There is also a step-by-step guide for configuring PGP on Linux
  available at
  http://mercury.chem.pitt.edu/~angel/LinuxFocus/English/November1997/article7.html.
  It was written for the international version of PGP, but is easily
  adaptable to the United States version.  You may also need a patch for
  some of the latest versions of Linux; the patch is available at
  ftp://metalab.unc.edu/pub/Linux/apps/crypto.

  There is a project working on a free re-implementation of pgp with
  open source. GnuPG is a complete and free replacement for PGP. Because
  it does not use IDEA or RSA it can be used without any restrictions.
  GnuPG is nearly in compliance with OpenPGP.  See the GNU Privacy Guard
  web page for more information: http://www.gnupg.org/.

  More information on cryptography can be found in the RSA cryptography
  FAQ, available at http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/newfaq/.  Here you will
  find information on such terms as "Diffie-Hellman", "public-key
  cryptography", "digital certificates", etc.



  6.2.  SSL, S-HTTP, HTTPS and S/MIME

  Often users ask about the differences between the various security and
  encryption protocols, and how to use them.  While this isn't an
  encryption document, it is a good idea to explain briefly what each
  protocol is, and where to find more information.

  o  SSL: - SSL, or Secure Sockets Layer, is an encryption method
     developed by Netscape to provide security over the Internet.  It
     supports several different encryption protocols, and provides
     client and server authentication.  SSL operates at the transport
     layer, creates a secure encrypted channel of data, and thus can
     seamlessly encrypt data of many types.  This is most commonly seen
     when going to a secure site to view a secure online document with
     Communicator, and serves as the basis for secure communications
     with Communicator, as well as many other Netscape Communications
     data encryption.  More information can be found at
     http://www.consensus.com/security/ssl-talk-faq.html.  Information
     on Netscape's other security implementations, and a good starting
     point for these protocols is available at
     http://home.netscape.com/info/security-doc.html.


  o  S-HTTP: - S-HTTP is another protocol that provides security
     services across the Internet.  It was designed to provide
     confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiability
     [cannot be mistaken for someone else] while supporting multiple
     key-management mechanisms and cryptographic algorithms via option
     negotiation between the parties involved in each transaction. S-
     HTTP is limited to the specific software that is implementing it,
     and encrypts each message individually. [ From RSA Cryptography
     FAQ, page 138]


  o  S/MIME: - S/MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension,
     is an encryption standard used to encrypt electronic mail and other
     types of messages on the Internet.  It is an open standard
     developed by RSA, so it is likely we will see it on Linux one day
     soon.  More information on S/MIME can be found at
     http://home.netscape.com/assist/security/smime/overview.html.


  6.3.  Linux IPSEC Implementations

  Along with CIPE, and other forms of data encryption, there are also
  several other implementations of IPSEC for Linux.  IPSEC is an effort
  by the IETF to create cryptographically-secure communications at the
  IP network level, and to provide authentication, integrity, access
  control, and confidentiality.  Information on IPSEC and Internet draft
  can be found at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html.
  You can also find links to other protocols involving key management,
  and an IPSEC mailing list and archives.

  The x-kernel Linux implementation, which is being developed at the
  University of Arizona, uses an object-based framework for implementing
  network protocols called x-kernel, and can be found at
  http://www.cs.arizona.edu/xkernel/hpcc-blue/linux.html.  Most simply,
  the x-kernel is a method of passing messages at the kernel level,
  which makes for an easier implementation.

  Another freely-available IPSEC implementation is the Linux FreeS/WAN
  IPSEC.  Their web page states,

       "These services allow you to build secure tunnels through
       untrusted networks. Everything passing through the untrusted
       net is encrypted by the IPSEC gateway machine and decrypted
       by the gateway at the other end. The result is Virtual Pri-
       vate Network or VPN. This is a network which is effectively
       private even though it includes machines at several differ-
       ent sites connected by the insecure Internet."


  It's available for download from http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan/, and
  has just reached 1.0 at the time of this writing.

  As with other forms of cryptography, it is not distributed with the
  kernel by default due to export restrictions.


  6.4.  ssh  (Secure Shell) and stelnet

  ssh and stelnet are suite's of programs that allow you to login to
  remote systems and have a encrypted connection.

  openssh is a suite of programs used as a secure replacement for
  rlogin, rsh and rcp.  It uses public-key cryptography to encrypt
  communications between two hosts, as well as to authenticate users.
  It can be used to securely login to a remote host or copy data between
  hosts, while preventing man-in-the-middle attacks (session hijacking)
  and DNS spoofing.  It will perform data compression on your
  connections, and secure X11 communications between hosts.

  There are several ssh implementiations now. The original commercial
  implementation by Data Fellows can be found at The ssh home page can
  be found at http://www.datafellows.com.

  The excellent Openssh implementation is based on a early version of
  the datafellows ssh and has been totally reworked to not include any
  patented or propriatary peices. It is free and under a BSD liscence.
  It can be found at: http://www.openssh.com.

  There is also a open source project to re-implement ssh from the
  ground up called "psst...". For more information see:
  http://www.net.lut.ac.uk/psst/

  You can also use ssh from your Windows workstation to your Linux ssh
  server.  There are several freely available Windows client
  implementations, including the one at
  http://guardian.htu.tuwien.ac.at/therapy/ssh/ as well as a commercial
  implementation from DataFellows, at http://www.datafellows.com.

  SSLeay is a free implementation of Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer
  protocol, developed by Eric Young.  It includes several applications,
  such as Secure telnet, a module for Apache, several databases, as well
  as several algorithms including DES, IDEA and Blowfish.

  Using this library, a secure telnet replacement has been created that
  does encryption over a telnet connection.  Unlike SSH, stelnet uses
  SSL, the Secure Sockets Layer protocol developed by Netscape.  You can
  find Secure telnet and Secure FTP by starting with the SSLeay FAQ,
  available at http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/.

  SRP is another secure telnet/ftp implementation. From their web page:


       "The SRP project is developing secure Internet software for
       free worldwide use. Starting with a fully-secure Telnet and
       FTP distribution, we hope to supplant weak networked authen-
       tication systems with strong replacements that do not sacri-
       fice user-friendliness for security. Security should be the
       default, not an option!"


  For more information, go to http://srp.stanford.edu/srp.


  6.5.  PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules

  Newer versions of the Red Hat Linux distribution ship with a unified
  authentication scheme called "PAM". PAM allows you to change your
  authentication methods and requirements on the fly, and encapsulate
  all local authentication methods without recompiling any of your
  binaries.  Configuration of PAM is beyond the scope of this document,
  but be sure to take a look at the PAM web site for more information.
  http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/index.html.

  Just a few of the things you can do with PAM:


  o  Use encryption other than DES for your passwords. (Making them
     harder to brute-force decode)

  o  Set resource limits on all your users so they can't perform denial-
     of-service attacks (number of processes, amount of memory, etc)

  o  Enable shadow passwords (see below) on the fly

  o  allow specific users to login only at specific times from specific
     places

  Within a few hours of installing and configuring your system, you can
  prevent many attacks before they even occur.  For example, use PAM to
  disable the system-wide usage of .rhosts files in user's home
  directories by adding these lines to /etc/pam.d/rlogin:


                       #
                       # Disable rsh/rlogin/rexec for users
                       #
                       login auth required pam_rhosts_auth.so no_rhosts



  6.6.  Cryptographic IP Encapsulation (CIPE)

  The primary goal of this software is to provide a facility for secure
  (against eavesdropping, including traffic analysis, and faked message
  injection) subnetwork interconnection across an insecure packet
  network such as the Internet.

  CIPE encrypts the data at the network level.  Packets traveling
  between hosts on the network are encrypted.  The encryption engine is
  placed near the driver which sends and receives packets.

  This is unlike SSH, which encrypts the data by connection, at the
  socket level.  A logical connection between programs running on
  different hosts is encrypted.

  CIPE can be used in tunnelling, in order to create a Virtual Private
  Network.  Low-level encryption has the advantage that it can be made
  to work transparently between the two networks connected in the VPN,
  without any change to application software.

  Summarized from the CIPE documentation:


       The IPSEC standards define a set of protocols which can be
       used (among other things) to build encrypted VPNs.  However,
       IPSEC is a rather heavyweight and complicated protocol set
       with a lot of options, implementations of the full protocol
       set are still rarely used and some issues (such as key man-
       agement) are still not fully resolved.  CIPE uses a simpler
       approach, in which many things which can be parameterized
       (such as the choice of the actual encryption algorithm used)
       are an install-time fixed choice.  This limits flexibility,
       but allows for a simple (and therefore efficient, easy to
       debug...)  implementation.


  Further information can be found at
  http://www.inka.de/~bigred/devel/cipe.html

  As with other forms of cryptography, it is not distributed with the
  kernel by default due to export restrictions.



  6.7.  Kerberos

  Kerberos is an authentication system developed by the Athena Project
  at MIT. When a user logs in, Kerberos authenticates that user (using a
  password), and provides the user with a way to prove her identity to
  other servers and hosts scattered around the network.

  This authentication is then used by programs such as rlogin to allow
  the user to login to other hosts without a password (in place of the
  .rhosts file).  This authentication method can also used by the mail
  system in order to guarantee that mail is delivered to the correct
  person, as well as to guarantee that the sender is who he claims to
  be.

  Kerberos and the other programs that come with it, prevent users from
  "spoofing" the system into believing they are someone else.
  Unfortunately, installing Kerberos is very intrusive, requiring the
  modification or replacement of numerous standard programs.

  You can find more information about kerberos by looking at the
  kerberos FAQ, and the code can be found at
  http://nii.isi.edu/info/kerberos/.

  [From: Stein, Jennifer G., Clifford Neuman, and Jeffrey L. Schiller.
  "Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open Network Systems." USENIX
  Conference Proceedings, Dallas, Texas, Winter 1998.]

  Kerberos should not be your first step in improving security of your
  host.  It is quite involved, and not as widely used as, say, SSH.


  6.8.  Shadow Passwords.

  Shadow passwords are a means of keeping your encrypted password
  information secret from normal users. Recent versions of both Red Hat
  and Debian Linux use shadow passwords by default, but on other
  systems, encrypted passwords are stored in /etc/passwd file for all to
  read. Anyone can then run password-guesser programs on them and
  attempt to determine what they are.  Shadow passwords, by contrast,
  are saved in /etc/shadow, which only privileged users can read. In
  order to use shadow passwords, you need to make sure all your
  utilities that need access to password information are recompiled to
  support them. PAM (above) also allows you to just plug in a shadow
  module; it doesn't require re-compilation of executables.  You can
  refer to the Shadow-Password HOWTO for further information if
  necessary.  It is available at
  http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Shadow-Password-HOWTO.html It is
  rather dated now, and will not be required for distributions
  supporting PAM.


  6.9.  "Crack" and "John the Ripper"

  If for some reason your passwd program is not enforcing hard-to-guess
  passwords, you might want to run a password-cracking program and make
  sure your users' passwords are secure.

  Password cracking programs work on a simple idea: they try every word
  in the dictionary, and then variations on those words, encrypting each
  one and checking it against your encrypted password. If they get a
  match they know what your password is.

  There are a number of programs out there...the two most notable of
  which are "Crack" and "John the Ripper"
  (http://www.false.com/security/john/index.html) . They will take up a
  lot of your cpu time, but you should be able to tell if an attacker
  could get in using them by running them first yourself and notifying
  users with weak passwords. Note that an attacker would have to use
  some other hole first in order to read your /etc/passwd file, but such
  holes are more common than you might think.

  Because security is only as strong as the most insecure host, it is
  worth mentioning that if you have any Windows machines on your
  network, you should check out L0phtCrack, a Crack implementation for
  Windows.  It's available from http://www.l0pht.com


  6.10.  CFS - Cryptographic File System and TCFS - Transparent Crypto-
  graphic File System

  CFS is a way of encrypting entire directory trees and allowing users
  to store encrypted files on them. It uses an NFS server running on the
  local machine. RPMS are available at http://www.zedz.net/redhat/, and
  more information on how it all works is at
  ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/.

  TCFS improves on CFS by adding more integration with the file system,
  so that it's transparent to users that the file system that is
  encrypted. More information at: http://edu-gw.dia.unisa.it/tcfs/.

  It also need not be used on entire filesystems. It works on directory
  trees as well.


  6.11.  X11, SVGA and display security


  6.11.1.  X11

  It's important for you to secure your graphical display to prevent
  attackers from grabbing your passwords as you type them, reading
  documents or information you are reading on your screen, or even using
  a hole to gain root access. Running remote X applications over a
  network also can be fraught with peril, allowing sniffers to see all
  your interaction with the remote system.

  X has a number of access-control mechanisms. The simplest of them is
  host-based: you use xhost to specify the hosts that are allowed access
  to your display. This is not very secure at all, because if someone
  has access to your machine, they can xhost + their machine and get in
  easily. Also, if you have to allow access from an untrusted machine,
  anyone there can compromise your display.

  When using xdm (X Display Manager) to log in, you get a much better
  access method: MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1. A 128-bit "cookie" is generated and
  stored in your .Xauthority file. If you need to allow a remote machine
  access to your display, you can use the xauth command and the
  information in your .Xauthority file to provide access to only that
  connection.  See the Remote-X-Apps mini-howto, available at
  http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/mini/Remote-X-Apps.html.

  You can also use ssh (see ``'', above) to allow secure X connections.
  This has the advantage of also being transparent to the end user, and
  means that no unencrypted data flows across the network.

  Take a look at the Xsecurity man page for more information on X
  security. The safe bet is to use xdm to login to your console and then
  use ssh to go to remote sites on which you wish to run X programs.


  6.11.2.  SVGA

  SVGAlib programs are typically SUID-root in order to access all your
  Linux machine's video hardware. This makes them very dangerous. If
  they crash, you typically need to reboot your machine to get a usable
  console back. Make sure any SVGA programs you are running are
  authentic, and can at least be somewhat trusted. Even better, don't
  run them at all.


  6.11.3.  GGI (Generic Graphics Interface project)

  The Linux GGI project is trying to solve several of the problems with
  video interfaces on Linux. GGI will move a small piece of the video
  code into the Linux kernel, and then control access to the video
  system. This means GGI will be able to restore your console at any
  time to a known good state. They will also allow a secure attention
  key, so you can be sure that there is no Trojan horse login program
  running on your console. http://synergy.caltech.edu/~ggi/


  7.  Kernel Security

  This is a description of the kernel configuration options that relate
  to security, and an explanation of what they do, and how to use them.

  As the kernel controls your computer's networking, it is important
  that it be very secure, and not be compromised. To prevent some of the
  latest networking attacks, you should try to keep your kernel version
  current. You can find new kernels at  <ftp://ftp.kernel.org> or from
  your distribution vendor.

  There is also a international group providing a single unified crypto
  patch to the mainstream Lnux kernel. This patch provides support for a
  number of cyrptographic subsystems and things that cannot be included
  in the mainstream kernel due to export restrictions. For more
  information, visit their web page at: http://www.kerneli.org
  7.1.  2.0 Kernel Compile Options

  For 2.0.x kernels, the following options apply. You should see these
  options during the kernel configuration process.  Many of the comments
  here are from ./linux/Documentation/Configure.help, which is the same
  document that is referenced while using the Help facility during the
  make config stage of compiling the kernel.


  o  Network Firewalls (CONFIG_FIREWALL)

     This option should be on if you intend to run any firewalling or
     masquerading on your Lnux machine. If it's just going to be a
     regular client machine, it's safe to say no.


  o  IP: forwarding/gatewaying (CONFIG_IP_FORWARD)

     If you enable IP forwarding, your Linux box essentially becomes a
     router.  If your machine is on a network, you could be forwarding
     data from one network to another, and perhaps subverting a firewall
     that was put there to prevent this from happening.  Normal dial-up
     users will want to disable this, and other users should concentrate
     on the security implications of doing this.  Firewall machines will
     want this enabled, and used in conjunction with firewall software.

     You can enable IP forwarding dynamically using the following
     command:



               root#  echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward



  and disable it with the command:


               root#  echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward



  Keep in mind the files in /proc are "virtual" files and the shown size
  of the file might not reflect the data output from it.


  o  IP: syn cookies (CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES)

     a "SYN Attack" is a denial of service (DoS) attack that consumes
     all the resources on your machine, forcing you to reboot.  We can't
     think of a reason you wouldn't normally enable this. In the 2.2.x
     kernel series this config option merely allows syn cookies, but
     does not enable them. To enable them, you have to do:



                       root# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies <P>



  o  IP: Firewalling (CONFIG_IP_FIREWALL)

     This option is necessary if you are going to configure your machine
     as a firewall, do masquerading, or wish to protect your dial-up
     workstation from someone entering via your PPP dial-up interface.



  o  IP: firewall packet logging (CONFIG_IP_FIREWALL_VERBOSE)

     This option gives you information about packets your firewall
     received, like sender, recipient, port, etc.

  o  IP: Drop source routed frames (CONFIG_IP_NOSR)

     This option should be enabled.  Source routed frames contain the
     entire path to their destination inside of the packet.  This means
     that routers through which the packet goes do not need to inspect
     it, and just forward it on. This could lead to data entering your
     system that may be a potential exploit.


  o  IP: masquerading (CONFIG_IP_MASQUERADE) If one of the computers on
     your local network for which your Linux box acts as a firewall
     wants to send something to the outside, your box can "masquerade"
     as that host, i.e., it forwards the traffic to the intended
     destination, but makes it look like it came from the firewall box
     itself.  See http://www.indyramp.com/masq for more information.


  o  IP: ICMP masquerading (CONFIG_IP_MASQUERADE_ICMP) This option adds
     ICMP masquerading to the previous option of only masquerading TCP
     or UDP traffic.


  o  IP: transparent proxy support (CONFIG_IP_TRANSPARENT_PROXY) This
     enables your Linux firewall to transparently redirect any network
     traffic originating from the local network and destined for a
     remote host to a local server, called a "transparent proxy server".
     This makes the local computers think they are talking to the remote
     end, while in fact they are connected to the local proxy.  See the
     IP-Masquerading HOWTO and http://www.indyramp.com/masq for more
     information.


  o  IP: always defragment (CONFIG_IP_ALWAYS_DEFRAG)

     Generally this option is disabled, but if you are building a
     firewall or a masquerading host, you will want to enable it.  When
     data is sent from one host to another, it does not always get sent
     as a single packet of data, but rather it is fragmented into
     several pieces.  The problem with this is that the port numbers are
     only stored in the first fragment.  This means that someone can
     insert information into the remaining packets that isn't supposed
     to be there.  It could also prevent a teardrop attack against an
     internal host that is not yet itself patched against it.


  o  Packet Signatures (CONFIG_NCPFS_PACKET_SIGNING)

     This is an option that is available in the 2.2.x kernel series that
     will sign NCP packets for stronger security.  Normally you can
     leave it off, but it is there if you do need it.


  o  IP: Firewall packet netlink device (CONFIG_IP_FIREWALL_NETLINK)

     This is a really neat option that allows you to analyze the first
     128 bytes of the packets in a user-space program, to determine if
     you would like to accept or deny the packet, based on its validity.


  7.2.  2.2 Kernel Compile Options

  For 2.2.x kernels, many of the options are the same, but a few new
  ones have been developed.  Many of the comments here are from
  ./linux/Documentation/Configure.help, which is the same document that
  is referenced while using the Help facility during the make config
  stage of compiling the kernel. Only the newly- added options are
  listed below.  Consult the 2.0 description for a list of other
  necessary options.  The most significant change in the 2.2 kernel
  series is the IP firewalling code.  The ipchains program is now used
  to install IP firewalling, instead of the ipfwadm program used in the
  2.0 kernel.


  o  Socket Filtering (CONFIG_FILTER)

     For most people, it's safe to say no to this option. This option
     allows you to connect a userspace filter to any socket and
     determine if packets should be allowed or denied. Unless you have a
     very specific need and are capable of programming such a filter,
     you should say no. Also note that as of this writing, all protocols
     were supported except TCP.


  o  Port Forwarding Port Forwarding is an addition to IP Masquerading
     which allows some forwarding of packets from outside to inside a
     firewall on given ports. This could be useful if, for example, you
     want to run a web server behind the firewall or masquerading host
     and that web server should be accessible from the outside world. An
     external client sends a request to port 80 of the firewall, the
     firewall forwards this request to the web server, the web server
     handles the request and the results are sent through the firewall
     to the original client. The client thinks that the firewall machine
     itself is running the web server. This can also be used for load
     balancing if you have a farm of identical web servers behind the
     firewall.

     Information about this feature is available from
     http://www.monmouth.demon.co.uk/ipsubs/portforwarding.html (to
     browse the WWW, you need to have access to a machine on the
     Internet that has a program like lynx or netscape). For general
     info, please see
     ftp://ftp.compsoc.net/users/steve/ipportfw/linux21/


  o  Socket Filtering (CONFIG_FILTER) Using this option, user-space
     programs can attach a filter to any socket and thereby tell the
     kernel that it should allow or disallow certain types of data to
     get through the socket.  Linux socket filtering works on all socket
     types except TCP for now.  See the text file
     ./linux/Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information.


  o  IP: Masquerading The 2.2 kernel masquerading has been improved.  It
     provides additional support for masquerading special protocols,
     etc. Be sure to read the IP Chains HOWTO for more information.


  7.3.  Kernel Devices

  There are a few block and character devices available on Linux that
  will also help you with security.
  The two devices /dev/random and /dev/urandom are provided by the
  kernel to provide random data at any time.

  Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom should be secure enough to use in
  generating PGP keys, ssh challenges, and other applications where
  secure random numbers are required.  Attackers should be unable to
  predict the next number given any initial sequence of numbers from
  these sources.  There has been a lot of effort put in to ensuring that
  the numbers you get from these sources are random in every sense of
  the word.

  The only difference between the two devices, is that /dev/random runs
  out of random bytes and it makes you wait for more to be accumulated.
  Note that on some systems, it can block for a long time waiting for
  new user-generated entropy to be entered into the system.  So you have
  to use care before using /dev/random.  (Perhaps the best thing to do
  is to use it when you're generating sensitive keying information, and
  you tell the user to pound on the keyboard repeatedly until you print
  out "OK, enough".)

  /dev/random is high quality entropy, generated from measuring the
  inter-interrupt times etc. It blocks until enough bits of random data
  are available.

  /dev/urandom is similar, but when the store of entropy is running low,
  it'll return a cryptographically strong hash of what there is. This
  isn't as secure, but it's enough for most applications.

  You might read from the devices using something like:



               root#  head -c 6 /dev/urandom | mimencode



  This will print eight random characters on the console, suitable for
  password generation.  You can find mimencode in the metamail package.

  See /usr/src/linux/drivers/char/random.c for a description of the
  algorithm.

  Thanks to Theodore Y. Ts'o, Jon Lewis, and others from Linux-kernel
  for helping me (Dave) with this.


  8.  Network Security

  Network security is becoming more and more important as people spend
  more and more time connected. Compromising network security is often
  much easier than compromising physical or local security, and is much
  more common.

  There are a number of good tools to assist with network security, and
  more and more of them are shipping with Linux distributions.


  8.1.  Packet Sniffers

  One of the most common ways intruders gain access to more systems on
  your network is by employing a packet sniffer on a already compromised
  host. This "sniffer" just listens on the Ethernet port for things like
  passwd and login and su in the packet stream and then logs the traffic
  after that. This way, attackers gain passwords for systems they are
  not even attempting to break into. Clear-text passwords are very
  vulnerable to this attack.

  Example: Host A has been compromised. Attacker installs a sniffer.
  Sniffer picks up admin logging into Host B from Host C. It gets the
  admin's personal password as they login to B. Then, the admin does a
  su to fix a problem. They now have the root password for Host B. Later
  the admin lets someone telnet from his account to Host Z on another
  site. Now the attacker has a password/login on Host Z.

  In this day and age, the attacker doesn't even need to compromise a
  system to do this: they could also bring a laptop or pc into a
  building and tap into your net.

  Using ssh or other encrypted password methods thwarts this attack.
  Things like APOP for POP accounts also prevents this attack. (Normal
  POP logins are very vulnerable to this, as is anything that sends
  clear-text passwords over the network.)


  8.2.  System services and tcp_wrappers

  Before you put your Linux system on ANY network the first thing to
  look at is what services you need to offer. Services that you do not
  need to offer should be disabled so that you have one less thing to
  worry about and attackers have one less place to look for a hole.

  There are a number of ways to disable services under Linux. You can
  look at your /etc/inetd.conf file and see what services are being
  offered by your inetd. Disable any that you do not need by commenting
  them out (# at the beginning of the line), and then sending your inetd
  process a SIGHUP.

  You can also remove (or comment out) services in your /etc/services
  file. This will mean that local clients will also be unable to find
  the service (i.e., if you remove ftp, and try and ftp to a remote site
  from that machine it will fail with an "unknown service" message).
  It's usually not worth the trouble to remove services from
  /etc/services, since it provides no additional security. If a local
  person wanted to use ftp even though you had commented it out, they
  would make their own client that used the common FTP port and would
  still work fine.

  Some of the services you might want to leave enabled are:


  o  ftp

  o  telnet (or ssh)

  o  mail, such as pop-3 or imap

  o  identd

  If you know you are not going to use some particular package, you can
  also delete it entirely. rpm -e packagename under the Red Hat
  distribution will erase an entire package. Under debian dpkg --remove
  does the same thing.

  Additionally, you really want to disable the rsh/rlogin/rcp utilities,
  including login (used by rlogin), shell (used by rcp), and exec (used
  by rsh) from being started in /etc/inetd.conf.  These protocols are
  extremely insecure and have been the cause of exploits in the past.

  You should check /etc/rc.d/rc[0-9].d (on Red Hat; /etc/rc[0-9].d on
  Debian), and see if any of the servers started in those directories
  are not needed. The files in those directories are actually symbolic
  links to files in the directory /etc/rc.d/init.d (on Red Hat;
  /etc/init.d on Debian).  Renaming the files in the init.d directory
  disables all the symbolic links that point to that file.  If you only
  wish to disable a service for a particular run level, rename the
  appropriate symbolic link by replacing  the upper-case S with a lower-
  case s, like this:



              root#  cd /etc/rc6.d
              root#  mv S45dhcpd s45dhcpd



  If you have BSD-style rc files, you will want to check /etc/rc* for
  programs you don't need.

  Most Linux distributions ship with tcp_wrappers "wrapping" all your
  TCP services. A tcp_wrapper (tcpd) is invoked from inetd instead of
  the real server. tcpd then checks the host that is requesting the
  service, and either executes the real server, or denies access from
  that host. tcpd allows you to restrict access to your TCP services.
  You should make a /etc/hosts.allow and add in only those hosts that
  need to have access to your machine's services.

  If you are a home dialup user, we suggest you deny ALL. tcpd also logs
  failed attempts to access services, so this can alert you if you are
  under attack. If you add new services, you should be sure to configure
  them to use tcp_wrappers if they are TCP-based.  For example, a normal
  dial-up user can prevent outsiders from connecting to his machine, yet
  still have the ability to retrieve mail, and make network connections
  to the Internet.  To do this, you might add the following to your
  /etc/hosts.allow:

  ALL: 127.

  And of course /etc/hosts.deny would contain:

  ALL: ALL

  which will prevent external connections to your machine, yet still
  allow you from the inside to connect to servers on the Internet.

  Keep in mind that tcp_wrappers only protects services executed from
  inetd, and a select few others.  There very well may be other services
  running on your machine.  You can use netstat -ta to find a list of
  all the services your machine is offering.


  8.3.  Verify Your DNS Information

  Keeping up-to-date DNS information about all hosts on your network can
  help to increase security.  If an unauthorized host becomes connected
  to your network, you can recognize it by its lack of a DNS entry.
  Many services can be configured to not accept connections from hosts
  that do not have valid DNS entries.


  8.4.  identd

  identd is a small program that typically runs out of your inetd
  server. It keeps track of what user is running what TCP service, and
  then reports this to whoever requests it.


  Many people misunderstand the usefulness of identd, and so disable it
  or block all off site requests for it. identd is not there to help out
  remote sites. There is no way of knowing if the data you get from the
  remote identd is correct or not. There is no authentication in identd
  requests.

  Why would you want to run it then? Because it helps you out, and is
  another data-point in tracking. If your identd is un compromised, then
  you know it's telling remote sites the user-name or uid of people
  using TCP services. If the admin at a remote site comes back to you
  and tells you user so-and-so was trying to hack into their site, you
  can easily take action against that user. If you are not running
  identd, you will have to look at lots and lots of logs, figure out who
  was on at the time, and in general take a lot more time to track down
  the user.

  The identd that ships with most distributions is more configurable
  than many people think. You can disable it for specific users (they
  can make a .noident file), you can log all identd requests (We
  recommend it), you can even have identd return a uid instead of a user
  name or even NO-USER.


  8.5.  SATAN, ISS, and Other Network Scanners

  There are a number of different software packages out there that do
  port and service-based scanning of machines or networks. SATAN, ISS,
  SAINT, and Nessus are some of the more well-known ones. This software
  connects to the target machine (or all the target machines on a
  network) on all the ports they can, and try to determine what service
  is running there. Based on this information, you can tell if the
  machine is vulnerable to a specific exploit on that server.

  SATAN (Security Administrator's Tool for Analyzing Networks) is a port
  scanner with a web interface. It can be configured to do light,
  medium, or strong checks on a machine or a network of machines. It's a
  good idea to get SATAN and scan your machine or network, and fix the
  problems it finds. Make sure you get the copy of SATAN from metalab
  <http://metalab.unc.edu/pub/packages/security/Satan-for-Linux/> or a
  reputable FTP or web site. There was a Trojan copy of SATAN that was
  distributed out on the net.
  http://www.trouble.org/~zen/satan/satan.html. Note that SATAN has not
  been updated in quite a while, and some of the other tools below might
  do a better job.

  ISS (Internet Security Scanner) is another port-based scanner. It is
  faster than Satan, and thus might be better for large networks.
  However, SATAN tends to provide more information.

  Abacus is a suite of tools to provide host-based security and
  intrusion detection. Look at it's home page on the web for more
  information. http://www.psionic.com/abacus/

  SAINT is a updated version of SATAN. It is web-based and has many more
  up-to-date tests than SATAN. You can find out more about it at:
  http://www.wwdsi.com/~saint

  Nessus is a free security scanner. It has a GTK graphical interface
  for ease of use. It is also designed with a very nice plugin setup for
  new port-scanning tests. For more information, take a look at:
  http://www.nessus.org



  8.5.1.  Detecting Port Scans

  There are some tools designed to alert you to probes by SATAN and ISS
  and other scanning software. However, if you liberally use
  tcp_wrappers, and look over your log files regularly, you should be
  able to notice such probes. Even on the lowest setting, SATAN still
  leaves traces in the logs on a stock Red Hat system.

  There are also "stealth" port scanners.  A packet with the TCP ACK bit
  set (as is done with established connections) will likely get through
  a packet-filtering firewall.  The returned RST packet from a port that
  _had no established session_ can be taken as proof of life on that
  port.  I don't think TCP wrappers will detect this.


  8.6.  sendmail , qmail  and MTA's

  One of the most important services you can provide is a mail server.
  Unfortunately, it is also one of the most vulnerable to attack, simply
  due to the number of tasks it must perform and the privileges it
  typically needs.

  If you are using sendmail it is very important to keep up on current
  versions. sendmail has a long long history of security exploits.
  Always make sure you are running the most recent version from
  http://www.sendmail.org.

  Keep in mind that sendmail does not have to be running in order for
  you to send mail.  If you are a home user, you can disable sendmail
  entirely, and simply use your mail client to send mail.  You might
  also choose to remove the "-bd" flag from the sendmail startup file,
  thereby disabling incoming requests for mail.  In other words, you can
  execute sendmail from your startup script using the following instead:


                       # /usr/lib/sendmail -q15m



  This will cause sendmail to flush the mail queue every fifteen minutes
  for any messages that could not be successfully delivered on the first
  attempt.

  Many administrators choose not to use sendmail, and instead choose one
  of the other mail transport agents. You might consider switching over
  to qmail. qmail was designed with security in mind from the ground up.
  It's fast, stable, and secure. Qmail can be found at
  http://www.qmail.org

  In direct competition to qmail is "postfix", written by Wietse Venema,
  the author of tcp_wrappers and other security tools.  Formerly called
  vmailer, and sponsored by IBM, this is also a mail transport agent
  written from the ground up with security in mind.  You can find more
  information about postfix at http://www.postfix.org


  8.7.  Denial of Service Attacks

  A "Denial of Service" (DoS) attack is one where the attacker tries to
  make some resource too busy to answer legitimate requests, or to deny
  legitimate users access to your machine.

  Denial of service attacks have increased greatly in recent years. Some
  of the more popular and recent ones are listed below. Note that new
  ones show up all the time, so this is just a few examples. Read the
  Linux security lists and the bugtraq list and archives for more
  current information.


  o  SYN Flooding - SYN flooding is a network denial of service attack.
     It takes advantage of a "loophole" in the way TCP connections are
     created. The newer Linux kernels (2.0.30 and up) have several
     configurable options to prevent SYN flood attacks from denying
     people access to your machine or services. See ``Kernel Security''
     for proper kernel protection options.


  o  Pentium "F00F" Bug - It was recently discovered that a series of
     assembly codes sent to a genuine Intel Pentium processor would
     reboot the machine.  This affects every machine with a Pentium
     processor (not clones, not Pentium Pro or PII), no matter what
     operating system it's running. Linux kernels 2.0.32 and up contain
     a work around for this bug, preventing it from locking your
     machine. Kernel 2.0.33 has an improved version of the kernel fix,
     and is suggested over 2.0.32.  If you are running on a Pentium, you
     should upgrade now!


  o  Ping Flooding - Ping flooding is a simple brute-force denial of
     service attack. The attacker sends a "flood" of ICMP packets to
     your machine. If they are doing this from a host with better
     bandwidth than yours, your machine will be unable to send anything
     on the network. A variation on this attack, called "smurfing",
     sends ICMP packets to a host with your machine's return IP,
     allowing them to flood you less detectably.  You can find more
     information about the "smurf" attack at
     http://www.quadrunner.com/~chuegen/smurf.txt

     If you are ever under a ping flood attack, use a tool like tcpdump
     to determine where the packets are coming from (or appear to be
     coming from), then contact your provider with this information.
     Ping floods can most easily be stopped at the router level or by
     using a firewall.


  o  Ping o' Death - The Ping o' Death attack sends ICMP ECHO REQUEST
     packets that are too large to fit in the kernel data structures
     intended to store them.  Because sending a single, large (65,510
     bytes) "ping" packet to many systems will cause them to hang or
     even crash, this problem was quickly dubbed the "Ping o' Death."
     This one has long been fixed, and is no longer anything to worry
     about.


  o  Teardrop / New Tear - One of the most recent exploits involves a
     bug present in the IP fragmentation code on Linux and Windows
     platforms.  It is fixed in kernel version 2.0.33, and does not
     require selecting any kernel compile-time options to utilize the
     fix.  Linux is apparently not vulnerable to the "newtear" exploit.


     You can find code for most exploits, and a more in-depth
     description of how they work, at http://www.rootshell.com using
     their search engine.


  8.8.  NFS (Network File System) Security.

  NFS is a very widely-used file sharing protocol. It allows servers
  running nfsd and mountd to "export" entire filesystems to other
  machines using NFS filesystem support built in to their kernels (or
  some other client support if they are not Linux machines).  mountd
  keeps track of mounted filesystems in /etc/mtab, and can display them
  with showmount.

  Many sites use NFS to serve home directories to users, so that no
  matter what machine in the cluster they login to, they will have all
  their home files.

  There is some small amount of security allowed in exporting
  filesystems. You can make your nfsd map the remote root user (uid=0)
  to the nobody user, denying them total access to the files exported.
  However, since individual users have access to their own (or at least
  the same uid) files, the remote root user can login or su to their
  account and have total access to their files. This is only a small
  hindrance to an attacker that has access to mount your remote
  filesystems.

  If you must use NFS, make sure you export to only those machines that
  you really need to. Never export your entire root directory; export
  only directories you need to export.

  See the NFS HOWTO for more information on NFS, available at
  http://metalab.unc.edu/mdw/HOWTO/NFS-HOWTO.html


  8.9.  NIS (Network Information Service) (formerly YP).

  Network Information service (formerly YP) is a means of distributing
  information to a group of machines. The NIS master holds the
  information tables and converts them into NIS map files. These maps
  are then served over the network, allowing NIS client machines to get
  login, password, home directory and shell information (all the
  information in a standard /etc/passwd file). This allows users to
  change their password once and have it take effect on all the machines
  in the NIS domain.

  NIS is not at all secure. It was never meant to be. It was meant to be
  handy and useful. Anyone that can guess the name of your NIS domain
  (anywhere on the net) can get a copy of your passwd file, and use
  "crack" and "John the Ripper" against your users' passwords. Also, it
  is possible to spoof NIS and do all sorts of nasty tricks. If you must
  use NIS, make sure you are aware of the dangers.

  There is a much more secure replacement for NIS, called NIS+.  Check
  out the NIS HOWTO for more information:
  http://metalab.unc.edu/mdw/HOWTO/NIS-HOWTO.html


  8.10.  Firewalls

  Firewalls are a means of controlling what information is allowed into
  and out of your local network. Typically the firewall host is
  connected to the Internet and your local LAN, and the only access from
  your LAN to the Internet is through the firewall. This way the
  firewall can control what passes back and forth from the Internet and
  your LAN.

  There are a number of types of firewalls and methods of setting them
  up. Linux machines make pretty good firewalls. Firewall code can be
  built right into 2.0 and higher kernels. The user-space tools ipfwadm
  for 2.0 kernels and ipchains for 2.2 kernels, allows you to change, on
  the fly, the types of network traffic you allow.  You can also log
  particular types of network traffic.

  Firewalls are a very useful and important technique in securing your
  network. However, never think that because you have a firewall, you
  don't need to secure the machines behind it. This is a fatal mistake.
  Check out the very good Firewall-HOWTO at your latest metalab archive
  for more information on firewalls and Linux.
  http://metalab.unc.edu/mdw/HOWTO/Firewall-HOWTO.html

  More information can also be found in the IP-Masquerade mini-howto:
  http://metalab.unc.edu/mdw/HOWTO/mini/IP-Masquerade.html

  More information on ipfwadm (the tool that lets you change settings on
  your firewall, can be found at it's home page:
  http://www.xos.nl/linux/ipfwadm/

  If you have no experience with firewalls, and plan to set up one for
  more than just a simple security policy, the Firewalls book by
  O'Reilly and Associates or other online firewall document is mandatory
  reading.  Check out http://www.ora.com for more information.  The
  National Institute of Standards and Technology have put together an
  excellent document on firewalls.  Although dated 1995, it is still
  quite good.  You can find it at
  http://csrc.nist.gov/nistpubs/800-10/main.html.  Also of interest:


  o  The Freefire Project -- a list of freely-available firewall tools,
     available at http://sites.inka.de/sites/lina/freefire-
     l/index_en.html

  o  SunWorld Firewall Design -- written by the authors of the O'Reilly
     book, this provides a rough introduction to the different firewall
     types.  It's available at
     http://www.sunworld.com/swol-01-1996/swol-01-firewall.html

  o  Mason - the automated firewall builder for Linux. This is a
     firewall script that learns as you do the things you need to do on
     your network! More info at: http://www.pobox.com/~wstearns/mason/


  8.11.  IP Chains - Linux Kernel 2.2.x Firewalling

  Linux IP Firewalling Chains is an update to the 2.0 Linux firewalling
  code for the 2.2 kernel.  It has many more features than previous
  implementations, including:

  o  More flexible packet manipulations

  o  More complex accounting

  o  Simple policy changes possible atomically

  o  Fragments can be explicitly blocked, denied, etc.

  o  Logs suspicious packets.

  o  Can handle protocols other than ICMP/TCP/UDP.

  If you are currently using ipfwadm on your 2.0 kernel, there are
  scripts available to convert the ipfwadm command format to the format
  ipchains uses.

  Be sure to read the IP Chains HOWTO for further information.  It is
  available at http://www.rustcorp.com/linux/ipchains/HOWTO.html


  8.12.  VPNs - Virtual Private Networks

  VPN's are a way to establish a "virtual" network on top of some
  already-existing network. This virtual network often is encrypted and
  passes traffic only to and from some known entities that have joined
  the network. VPNs are often used to connect someone working at home
  over the public Internet to an internal company network.

  If you are running a Linux masquerading firewall and need to pass MS
  PPTP (Microsoft's VPN point-to-point product) packets, there is a
  Linux kernel patch out to do just that. See: ip-masq-vpn.

  There are several Linux VPN solutions available:

  o  vpnd. See the http://sunsite.auc.dk/vpnd/.

  o  Free S/Wan, available at http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan/

  o  ssh can be used to construct a VPN.  See the VPN mini-howto for
     more information.

  o  vps (virtual private server) at http://www.strongcrypto.com.

  See also the section on IPSEC for pointers and more information.


  9.  Security Preparation (before you go on-line)

  Ok, so you have checked over your system, and determined it's as
  secure as feasible, and you're ready to put it online.  There are a
  few things you should now do in order to prepare for an intrusion, so
  you can quickly disable the intruder, and get back up and running.


  9.1.  Make a Full Backup of Your Machine

  Discussion of backup methods and storage is beyond the scope of this
  document, but here are a few words relating to backups and security:

  If you have less than 650mb of data to store on a partition, a CD-R
  copy of your data is a good way to go (as it's hard to tamper with
  later, and if stored properly can last a long time). Tapes and other
  re-writable media should be write-protected as soon as your backup is
  complete, and then verified to prevent tampering. Make sure you store
  your backups in a secure off-line area. A good backup will ensure that
  you have a known good point to restore your system from.


  9.2.  Choosing a Good Backup Schedule

  A six-tape cycle is easy to maintain.  This includes four tapes for
  during the week, one tape for even Fridays, and one tape for odd
  Fridays.  Perform an incremental backup every day, and a full backup
  on the appropriate Friday tape. If you make some particularly
  important changes or add some important data to your system, a full
  backup might well be in order.


  9.3.  Backup Your RPM or Debian File Database

  In the event of an intrusion, you can use your RPM database like you
  would use tripwire, but only if you can be sure it too hasn't been
  modified.  You should copy the RPM database to a floppy, and keep this
  copy off-line at all times. The Debian distribution likely has
  something similar.

  The files /var/lib/rpm/fileindex.rpm and /var/lib/rpm/packages.rpm
  most likely won't fit on a single floppy.  But if compressed, each
  should fit on a seperate floppy.

  Now, when your system is compromised, you can use the command:



                               root#  rpm -Va



  to verify each file on the system.  See the rpm man page, as there are
  a few other options that can be included to make it less verbose.
  Keep in mind you must also be sure your RPM binary has not been com-
  promised.

  This means that every time a new RPM is added to the system, the RPM
  database will need to be rearchived.  You will have to decide the
  advantages versus drawbacks.


  9.4.  Keep Track of Your System Accounting Data

  It is very important that the information that comes from syslog not
  be compromised.  Making the files in /var/log readable and writable by
  only a limited number of users is a good start.

  Be sure to keep an eye on what gets written there, especially under
  the auth facility.  Multiple login failures, for example, can indicate
  an attempted break-in.

  Where to look for your log file will depend on your distribution. In a
  Linux system that conforms to the "Linux Filesystem Standard", such as
  Red Hat, you will want to look in /var/log and check messages,
  mail.log, and others.

  You can find out where your distribution is logging to by looking at
  your /etc/syslog.conf file. This is the file that tells syslogd (the
  system logging daemon) where to log various messages.

  You might also want to configure your log-rotating script or daemon to
  keep logs around longer so you have time to examine them. Take a look
  at the logrotate package on recent Red Hat distributions. Other
  distributions likely have a similar process.

  If your log files have been tampered with, see if you can determine
  when the tampering started, and what sort of things appeared to be
  tampered with. Are there large periods of time that cannot be
  accounted for?  Checking backup tapes (if you have any) for untampered
  log files is a good idea.

  Intruders typically modify log files in order to cover their tracks,
  but they should still be checked for strange happenings. You may
  notice the intruder attempting to gain entrance, or exploit a program
  in order to obtain the root account. You might see log entries before
  the intruder has time to modify them.

  You should also be sure to separate the auth facility from other log
  data, including attempts to switch users using su, login attempts, and
  other user accounting information.

  If possible, configure syslog to send a copy of the most important
  data to a secure system.  This will prevent an intruder from covering
  his tracks by deleting his login/su/ftp/etc attempts.  See the
  syslog.conf man page, and refer to the @ option.

  There are several more advanced syslogd programs out there. Take a
  look at http://www.core-sdi.com/ssyslog/ for Secure Syslog. Secure
  Syslog allows you to encrypt your syslog entries and make sure no one
  has tampered with them.

  Another syslogd with more features is syslog-ng. It allows you a lot
  more flexibility in your logging and also can has your remote syslog
  streams to prevent tampering.

  Finally, log files are much less useful when no one is reading them.
  Take some time out every once in a while to look over your log files,
  and get a feeling for what they look like on a normal day. Knowing
  this can help make unusual things stand out.


  9.5.  Apply All New System Updates.

  Most Linux users install from a CD-ROM. Due to the fast-paced nature
  of security fixes, new (fixed) programs are always being released.
  Before you connect your machine to the network, it's a good idea to
  check with your distribution's ftp site and get all the updated
  packages since you received your distribution CD-ROM. Many times these
  packages contain important security fixes, so it's a good idea to get
  them installed.


  10.  What To Do During and After a Breakin

  So you have followed some of the advice here (or elsewhere) and have
  detected a break-in? The first thing to do is to remain calm. Hasty
  actions can cause more harm than the attacker would have.


  10.1.  Security Compromise Underway.

  Spotting a security compromise under way can be a tense undertaking.
  How you react can have large consequences.

  If the compromise you are seeing is a physical one, odds are you have
  spotted someone who has broken into your home, office or lab. You
  should notify your local authorities. In a lab, you might have spotted
  someone trying to open a case or reboot a machine. Depending on your
  authority and procedures, you might ask them to stop, or contact your
  local security people.

  If you have detected a local user trying to compromise your security,
  the first thing to do is confirm they are in fact who you think they
  are. Check the site they are logging in from. Is it the site they
  normally log in from? No? Then use a non-electronic means of getting
  in touch. For instance, call them on the phone or walk over to their
  office/house and talk to them. If they agree that they are on, you can
  ask them to explain what they were doing or tell them to cease doing
  it. If they are not on, and have no idea what you are talking about,
  odds are this incident requires further investigation. Look into such
  incidents , and have lots of information before making any
  accusations.

  If you have detected a network compromise, the first thing to do (if
  you are able) is to disconnect your network. If they are connected via
  modem, unplug the modem cable; if they are connected via Ethernet,
  unplug the Ethernet cable. This will prevent them from doing any
  further damage, and they will probably see it as a network problem
  rather than detection.

  If you are unable to disconnect the network (if you have a busy site,
  or you do not have physical control of your machines), the next best
  step is to use something like tcp_wrappers or ipfwadm to deny access
  from the intruder's site.
  If you can't deny all people from the same site as the intruder,
  locking the user's account will have to do. Note that locking an
  account is not an easy thing. You have to keep in mind .rhosts files,
  FTP access, and a host of possible backdoors.

  After you have done one of the above (disconnected the network, denied
  access from their site, and/or disabled their account), you need to
  kill all their user processes and log them off.

  You should monitor your site well for the next few minutes, as the
  attacker will try to get back in. Perhaps using a different account,
  and/or from a different network address.


  10.2.  Security Compromise has already happened

  So you have either detected a compromise that has already happened or
  you have detected it and locked (hopefully) the offending attacker out
  of your system. Now what?


  10.2.1.  Closing the Hole

  If you are able to determine what means the attacker used to get into
  your system, you should try to close that hole. For instance, perhaps
  you see several FTP entries just before the user logged in. Disable
  the FTP service and check and see if there is an updated version, or
  if any of the lists know of a fix.

  Check all your log files, and make a visit to your security lists and
  pages and see if there are any new common exploits you can fix.  You
  can find Caldera security fixes at http://www.caldera.com/tech-
  ref/security/. Red Hat has not yet separated their security fixes from
  bug fixes, but their distribution errata is available at
  http://www.redhat.com/errata

  Debian now has a security mailing list and web page. See:
  http://www.debian.org/security/ for more information.

  It is very likely that if one vendor has released a security update,
  that most other Linux vendors will as well.

  There is now a Linux security auditing project. They are methodically
  going through all the user-space utilities and looking for possible
  security exploits and overflows. From their announcement:


       "We are attempting a systematic audit of Linux sources with
       a view to being as secure as OpenBSD. We have already uncov-
       ered (and fixed) some problems, but more help is welcome.
       The list is unmoderated and also a useful resource for gen-
       eral security discussions.  The list address is: security-
       audit@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk To subscribe, send a mail to:
       security-audit-subscribe@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk"


  If you don't lock the attacker out, they will likely be back. Not just
  back on your machine, but back somewhere on your network. If they were
  running a packet sniffer, odds are good they have access to other
  local machines.


  10.2.2.  Assessing the Damage

  The first thing is to assess the damage. What has been compromised?
  If you are running an integrity checker like Tripwire, you can use it
  to perform an integrity check; it should help to tell you what has
  been compromised.  If not, you will have to look around at all your
  important data.

  Since Linux systems are getting easier and easier to install, you
  might consider saving your config files, wiping your disk(s),
  reinstalling, then restoring your user files and your config files
  from backups. This will ensure that you have a new, clean system.  If
  you have to restore files from the compromised system, be especially
  cautious of any binaries that you restore, as they may be Trojan
  horses placed there by the intruder.

  Re-installation should be considered mandatory upon an intruder
  obtaining root access.  Additionally, you'd like to keep any evidence
  there is, so having a spare disk in the safe may make sense.

  Then you have to worry about how long ago the compromise happened, and
  whether the backups hold any damaged work.  More on backups later.


  10.2.3.  Backups, Backups, Backups!

  Having regular backups is a godsend for security matters. If your
  system is compromised, you can restore the data you need from backups.
  Of course, some data is valuable to the attacker too, and they will
  not only destroy it, they will steal it and have their own copies; but
  at least you will still have the data.

  You should check several backups back into the past before restoring a
  file that has been tampered with. The intruder could have compromised
  your files long ago, and you could have made many successful backups
  of the compromised file!

  Of course, there are also a raft of security concerns with backups.
  Make sure you are storing them in a secure place. Know who has access
  to them. (If an attacker can get your backups, they can have access to
  all your data without you ever knowing it.)


  10.2.4.  Tracking Down the Intruder.

  Ok, you have locked the intruder out, and recovered your system, but
  you're not quite done yet. While it is unlikely that most intruders
  will ever be caught, you should report the attack.

  You should report the attack to the admin contact at the site from
  which the attacker attacked your system. You can look up this contact
  with whois or the Internic database. You might send them an email with
  all applicable log entries and dates and times. If you spotted
  anything else distinctive about your intruder, you might mention that
  too. After sending the email, you should (if you are so inclined)
  follow up with a phone call. If that admin in turn spots your
  attacker, they might be able to talk to the admin of the site where
  they are coming from and so on.

  Good crackers often use many intermediate systems, some (or many) of
  which may not even know they have been compromised. Trying to track a
  cracker back to their home system can be difficult. Being polite to
  the admins you talk to can go a long way to getting help from them.

  You should also notify any security organizations you are a part of
  (CERT <http://www.cert.org/> or similar), as well as your Linux system
  vendor.



  11.  Security Sources

  There are a LOT of good sites out there for Unix security in general
  and Linux security specifically. It's very important to subscribe to
  one (or more) of the security mailing lists and keep current on
  security fixes. Most of these lists are very low volume, and very
  informative.


  11.1.  FTP Sites

  CERT is the Computer Emergency Response Team. They often send out
  alerts of current attacks and fixes. See ftp://ftp.cert.org for more
  information.

  ZEDZ (formerly Replay) (http://www.zedz.net) has archives of many
  security programs. Since they are outside the US, they don't need to
  obey US crypto restrictions.

  Matt Blaze is the author of CFS and a great security advocate.  Matt's
  archive is available at ftp://ftp.research.att.com/pub/mab
  <ftp://ftp.research.att.com/pub/mab>

  tue.nl is a great security FTP site in the Netherlands.
  ftp.win.tue.nl


  11.2.  Web Sites


  o  The Hacker FAQ is a FAQ about hackers: The Hacker FAQ

  o  The COAST archive has a large number of Unix security programs and
     information: COAST

  o  SuSe Security Page: http://www.suse.de/security/

  o  Rootshell.com is a great site for seeing what exploits are
     currently being used by crackers: http://www.rootshell.com/

  o  BUGTRAQ puts out advisories on security issues: BUGTRAQ archives

  o  CERT, the Computer Emergency Response Team, puts out advisories on
     common attacks on Unix platforms: CERT home

  o  Dan Farmer is the author of SATAN and many other security tools.
     His home site has some interesting security survey information, as
     well as security tools: http://www.trouble.org

  o  The Linux security WWW is a good site for Linux security
     information: Linux Security WWW

  o  Infilsec has a vulnerability engine that can tell you what
     vulnerabilities affect a specific platform:
     http://www.infilsec.com/vulnerabilities/

  o  CIAC sends out periodic security bulletins on common exploits:
     http://ciac.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/index/bulletins

  o  A good starting point for Linux Pluggable Authentication modules
     can be found at http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/.

  o  The Debian project has a web page for their security fixes and
     information. It is at http://www.debian.com/security/.


  o  WWW Security FAQ, written by Lincoln Stein, is a great web security
     reference. Find it at http://www.w3.org/Security/Faq/www-security-
     faq.html



  11.3.  Mailing Lists

  Bugtraq:  To subscribe to bugtraq, send mail to listserv@netspace.org
  containing the message body subscribe bugtraq. (see links above for
  archives).

  CIAC: Send e-mail to majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov. In the BODY (not
  subject) of the message put (either or both):

  subscribe ciac-bulletin



  Red Hat has a number of mailing lists, the most important of which is
  the redhat-announce list. You can read about security (and other)
  fixes as soon as they come out.  Send email to redhat-announce-list-
  request@redhat.com with the Subject

  Subscribe


  See http://www.redhat.com/mailing-lists/redhat-announce-list/ for more
  info and archives.

  The Debian project has a security mailing list that covers their
  security fixes. See http://www.debian.com/security/ for more
  information.



  11.4.  Books - Printed Reading Material

  There are a number of good security books out there. This section
  lists a few of them. In addition to the security specific books,
  security is covered in a number of other books on system
  administration.

  Building Internet Firewalls By D. Brent Chapman & Elizabeth D. Zwicky

  1st Edition September 1995

  ISBN: 1-56592-124-0

  Practical UNIX & Internet Security, 2nd Edition By Simson Garfinkel &
  Gene Spafford

  2nd Edition April 1996

  ISBN: 1-56592-148-8

  Computer Security Basics By Deborah Russell & G.T. Gangemi, Sr.

  1st Edition July 1991

  ISBN: 0-937175-71-4

  Linux Network Administrator's Guide By Olaf Kirch


  1st Edition January 1995

  ISBN: 1-56592-087-2

  PGP: Pretty Good Privacy By Simson Garfinkel

  1st Edition December 1994

  ISBN: 1-56592-098-8

  Computer Crime A Crimefighter's Handbook By David Icove, Karl Seger &
  William VonStorch (Consulting Editor Eugene H. Spafford)

  1st Edition August 1995

  ISBN: 1-56592-086-4


  Linux Security By John S. Flowers

  New Riders;

  ISBN: 0735700354

  March 1999


  Maximum Linux Security : A Hacker's Guide to Protecting Your Linux
  Server and Network

  Anonymous

  Paperback - 829 pages

  Sams;

  ISBN: 0672313413

  July 1999


  Intrusion Detection By Terry Escamilla

  Paperback - 416 pages (September 1998)

  John Wiley and Sons;

  ISBN: 0471290009


  Fighting Computer Crime

  Donn Parker

  Paperback - 526 pages (September 1998)

  John Wiley and Sons;

  ISBN: 0471163783


  12.  Glossary


  o  authentication: The process of knowing that the data received is
     the same as the data that was sent, and that the claimed sender is
     in fact the actual sender.


  o  bastion Host: A computer system that must be highly secured because
     it is vulnerable to attack, usually because it is exposed to the
     Internet and is a main point of contact for users of internal
     networks.  It gets its name from the highly fortified projects on
     the outer walls of medieval castles.  Bastions overlook critical
     areas of defense, usually having strong walls, room for extra
     troops, and the occasional useful tub of boiling hot oil for
     discouraging attackers.


  o  buffer overflow: Common coding style is to never allocate large
     enough buffers, and to not check for overflows.  When such buffers
     overflow, the executing program (daemon or set-uid program) can be
     tricked in doing some other things.  Generally this works by
     overwriting a function's return address on the stack to point to
     another location.


  o  denial of service: An attack that consumes the resources on your
     computer for things it was not intended to be doing, thus
     preventing normal use of your network resources for legitmate
     purposes.


  o  dual-homed Host: A general-purpose computer system that has at
     least two network interfaces.


  o  firewall: A component or set of components that restricts access
     between a protected network and the Internet, or between other sets
     of networks.


  o  host: A computer system attached to a network.


  o  IP spoofing: IP Spoofing is a complex technical attack that is made
     up of several components.  It is a security exploit that works by
     tricking computers in a trust relationship into thinking that you
     are someone that you really aren't.  There is an extensive paper
     written by daemon9, route, and infinity in the Volume Seven, Issue
     Forty-Eight issue of Phrack Magazine.


  o  non-repudiation: The property of a receiver being able to prove
     that the sender of some data did in fact send the data even though
     the sender might later deny ever having sent it.


  o  packet: The fundamental unit of communication on the Internet.


  o  packet filtering: The action a device takes to selectively control
     the flow of data to and from a network.  Packet filters allow or
     block packets, usually while routing them from one network to
     another (most often from the Internet to an internal network, and
     vice-versa). To accomplish packet filtering, you set up rules that
     specify what types of packets (those to or from a particular IP
     address or port) are to be allowed and what types are to be
     blocked.



  o  perimeter network: A network added between a protected network and
     an external network, in order to provide an additional layer of
     security.  A perimeter network is sometimes called a DMZ.


  o  proxy server: A program that deals with external servers on behalf
     of internal clients.  Proxy clients talk to proxy servers, which
     relay approved client requests to real servers, and relay answers
     back to clients.


  o  superuser: An informal name for root.


  13.  Frequently Asked Questions


  1. Is it more secure to compile driver support directly into the
     kernel, instead of making it a module?

     Answer: Some people think it is better to disable the ability to
     load device drivers using modules, because an intruder could load a
     Trojan module or a module that could affect system security.

     However, in order to load modules, you must be root.  The module
     object files are also only writable by root.  This means the
     intruder would need root access to insert a module.  If the
     intruder gains root access, there are more serious things to worry
     about than whether he will load a module.

     Modules are for dynamically loading support for a particular device
     that may be infrequently used.  On server machines, or firewalls
     for instance, this is very unlikely to happen.  For this reason, it
     would make more sense to compile support directly into the kernel
     for machines acting as a server.  Modules are also slower than
     support compiled directly in the kernel.


  2. Why does logging in as root from a remote machine always fail?

     Answer: See ``Root Security''.  This is done intentionally to
     prevent remote users from attempting to connect via telnet to your
     machine as root, which is a serious security vulnerability, because
     then the root password would be transmitted, in cleartext, across
     the network.  Don't forget: potential intruders have time on their
     side, and can run automated programs to find your password.


  3. How do I enable shadow passwords on my Red Hat 4.2 or 5.x Linux
     box?

     Answer:

     To enable shadow passwords, run pwconv as root, and /etc/shadow
     should now exist, and be used by applications.  If you are using RH
     4.2 or above, the PAM modules will automatically adapt to the
     change from using normal /etc/passwd to shadow passwords without
     any other change.

     Some background: shadow passwords is a mechanism for storing your
     password in a file other than the normal /etc/passwd file.  This
     has several advantages.  The first one is that the shadow file,
     /etc/shadow, is only readable by root, unlike /etc/passwd, which
     must remain readable by everyone.  The other advantage is that as
     the administrator, you can enable or disable accounts without
     everyone knowing the status of other users' accounts.
     The /etc/passwd file is then used to store user and group names,
     used by programs like /bin/ls to map the user ID to the proper
     username in a directory listing.

     The /etc/shadow file then only contains the username and his/her
     password, and perhaps accounting information, like when the account
     expires, etc.

     To enable shadow passwords, run pwconv as root, and /etc/shadow
     should now exist, and be used by applications.  Since you are using
     RH 4.2 or above, the PAM modules will automatically adapt to the
     change from using normal /etc/passwd to shadow passwords without
     any other change.

     Since you're interested in securing your passwords, perhaps you
     would also be interested in generating good passwords to begin
     with.  For this you can use the pam_cracklib module, which is part
     of PAM.  It runs your password against the Crack libraries to help
     you decide if it is too-easily guessable by password-cracking
     programs.


  4. How can I enable the Apache SSL extensions?

     Answer:


     a. Get SSLeay 0.8.0 or later from
        <ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL>


     b. Build and test and install it!


     c. Get Apache 1.2.5 source


     d. Get Apache SSLeay extensions from here
        <ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/SSL/apache_1.2.5+ssl_1.13.tar.gz>


     e. Unpack it in the apache-1.2.5 source directory and patch Apache
        as per the README.


     f. Configure and build it.


     You might also try ZEDZ net which has many pre-built packages, and
     is located outside of the United States.


  5. How can I manipulate user accounts, and still retain security?

     Answer:  The Red Hat distribution, especially RH5.0, contains a
     great number of tools to change the properties of user accounts.


  o  The pwconv and unpwconv programs can be used to convert between
     shadow and non-shadowed passwords.

  o  The pwck and grpck programs can be used to verify proper
     organization of the passwd and group files.

  o  The useradd, usermod, and userdel programs can be used to add,
     delete and modify user accounts.  The groupadd, groupmod, and
     groupdel programs will do the same for groups.

  o  Group passwords can be created using gpasswd.

     All these programs are "shadow-aware" -- that is, if you enable
     shadow they will use /etc/shadow for password information,
     otherwise they won't.

     See the respective man pages for further information.


  6. How can I password-protect specific HTML documents using Apache?

     I bet you didn't know about http://www.apacheweek.org, did you?

     You can find information on user authentication at
     http://www.apacheweek.com/features/userauth as well as other web
     server security tips from
     http://www.apache.org/docs/misc/security_tips.html

  14.  Conclusion

  By subscribing to the security alert mailing lists, and keeping
  current, you can do a lot towards securing your machine. If you pay
  attention to your log files and run something like tripwire regularly,
  you can do even more.

  A reasonable level of computer security is not difficult to maintain
  on a home machine. More effort is required on business machines, but
  Linux can indeed be a secure platform. Due to the nature of Linux
  development, security fixes often come out much faster than they do on
  commercial operating systems, making Linux an ideal platform when
  security is a requirement.



  15.  Acknowledgements

  Information here is collected from many sources. Thanks to the
  following that either indirectly or directly have contributed:
  following who either indirectly or directly have contributed:

       Rob Riggs rob@DevilsThumb.com

       S. Coffin scoffin@netcom.com

       Viktor Przebinda viktor@CRYSTAL.MATH.ou.edu

       Roelof Osinga roelof@eboa.com

       Kyle Hasselbacher kyle@carefree.quux.soltc.net

       David S. Jackson dsj@dsj.net

       Todd G. Ruskell ruskell@boulder.nist.gov

       Rogier Wolff R.E.Wolff@BitWizard.nl

       Antonomasia ant@notatla.demon.co.uk

       Nic Bellamy sky@wibble.net

       Eric Hanchrow offby1@blarg.net

       Robert J. Bergerrberger@ibd.com

  Ulrich Alpers lurchi@cdrom.uni-stuttgart.de

  David Noha dave@c-c-s.com

  Pavel Epifanov. epv@ibm.net

  Joe Germuska. joe@germuska.com

  Franklin S. Werren fswerren@bagpipes.net

  Paul Rusty Russell <Paul.Russell@rustcorp.com.au>

  Christine Gaunt <cgaunt@umich.edu>

  lin bhewitt@refmntutl01.afsc.noaa.gov

  A. Steinmetz astmail@yahoo.com

  Jun Morimoto morimoto@xantia.citroen.org

  Xiaotian Sun sunx@newton.me.berkeley.edu

  Eric Hanchrow offby1@blarg.net

  The following have translated this HOWTO into various other languages!

  A special thank you to all of them for help spreading the Linux
  word...

  Polish: Ziemek Borowski ziembor@FAQ-bot.ZiemBor.Waw.PL

  Japanese: FUJIWARA Teruyoshi fjwr@mtj.biglobe.ne.jp

  Indonesian: Tedi Heriyanto 22941219@students.ukdw.ac.id

  Korean: Bume Chang Boxcar0001@aol.com

  Spanish: Juan Carlos Fernandez piwiman@visionnetware.com

  Dutch: R. Ekkebus reggy@zeelandnet.nl



