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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" category="bcp" number="8552" ipr="trust200902" submissionType="IETF" consensus="yes" obsoletes="" updates="" xml:lang="en" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 2.22.1 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="DNS AttrLeaf">Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8552"/>
    <seriesInfo name="bcp" value="222"/>
    <author fullname="Dave Crocker" initials="D." surname="Crocker">
      <organization>Brandenburg InternetWorking</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>675 Spruce Dr.</street>
          <city>Sunnyvale</city>
          <region>CA</region>
          <code>94086</code>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <phone>+1.408.246.8253</phone>
        <email>dcrocker@bbiw.net</email>
        <uri>http://bbiw.net/</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date month="March" year="2019"/>
    <workgroup>dnsop</workgroup>
    <keyword>DNS</keyword>
    <keyword>Domain Name System&gt;</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t> Formally, any DNS Resource Record (RR) may occur under any domain name.
            However, some services use an operational convention for defining
            specific interpretations of an RRset by locating the records in a
            DNS branch under the parent domain to which the RRset actually
            applies. The top of this subordinate branch is defined by a naming
            convention that uses a reserved node name, which begins with 
            the underscore character (e.g., "_name"). The underscored naming construct defines a semantic
            scope for DNS record types that are associated with the parent
            domain above the underscored branch. This specification explores
            the nature of this DNS usage and defines the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry with IANA. The purpose of this
            registry is to avoid collisions resulting from the use of the same
            underscored name for different services.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The core Domain Name System (DNS) technical specifications  (<xref target="RFC1035" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC2181" format="default"/>) assign no
            semantics to domain names or their parts, and no constraints upon
            which resource record (RR) types are permitted to be stored under
            particular names <xref target="RFC1035" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC2181" format="default"/>.
            Over time, some leaf node names, such as
            <tt>www</tt> and <tt>ftp</tt>,
            have come to imply support for particular services, but this is a
            matter of operational convention rather than defined protocol
            semantics.

            This freedom in the basic technology has permitted a wide range of
            administrative and semantic policies to be used -- in parallel. DNS
            data semantics have been limited to the specification of particular
            resource record types on the expectation that new resource record
            types would be added as needed. Unfortunately, the addition of new resource record types has proven
extremely challenging, with significant adoption and use barriers
occurring over the life of the DNS.
      </t>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Underscore-Based Scoping</name>
        <t>As an alternative to defining a new RR TYPE, some DNS service
               enhancements call for using an existing resource record type but
               specifying a restricted scope for its occurrence. Scope is meant as
               a static property, not one dependent on the nature of the query.
               It is an artifact of the DNS name. That scope is a leaf node
               containing the specific resource record sets that are formally
               defined and constrained.  Specifically:

        </t>
        <ul empty="true" spacing="normal">
          <li>The leaf occurs in a branch having a distinguished naming
                     convention: there is a parent domain name to which the
                     scoped data applies. The branch is under this name. The
                     sub-branch is indicated by a sequence of one or more
                     reserved DNS node names; at least the first (highest) of
                     these names begins with an underscore (e.g., "_name").</li>
        </ul>
        <t> Because the DNS rules for a "host" (host name)
               do not allow use of the underscore character, 
               the underscored name is distinguishable from all legal host names <xref target="RFC0952" format="default"/>. Effectively, this convention for naming leaf nodes
               creates a space for the listing of "attributes" -- in the
               form of resource record types -- that are associated with the
               parent domain above the underscored sub-branch. </t>
        <t>The scoping feature is particularly useful when generalized
               resource record types are used -- notably
               <tt>TXT</tt>, <tt>SRV</tt>,
               and <tt>URI</tt>
          <xref target="RFC1035" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC2782" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC6335" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC7553" format="default"/>. It provides
               efficient separation of one use of them from others. Absent this
               separation, an undifferentiated mass of these RRsets is returned
               to the DNS client, which then must parse through the internals of
               the records in the hope of finding ones that are relevant. Worse,
               in some cases, the results are ambiguous because a record type
               might not adequately self-identify its specific purpose. With
               underscore-based scoping, only the relevant RRsets are
               returned.</t>
        <t>A simple example is <xref target="RFC6376" format="default">DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)</xref>, which
               uses <tt>_domainkey</tt> to define a place
               to hold a TXT record containing signing information for the
            parent domain.</t>
        <t> This specification formally defines how underscored names are
               used as "attribute" enhancements for their parent domain names.
               For example, the domain name "_domainkey.example." acts as an
               attribute of the parent domain name "example.". To avoid
               collisions resulting from the use of the same underscored
               names for different applications using the same resource record
               type, this document establishes the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry with IANA.    Use of such node names, which begin with an underscore character,
   is reserved when they are the underscored name closest to the DNS
   root; as in that case, they are considered "global".   Underscored names that are farther down the hierarchy are
               handled within the scope of the global underscored node name. 
        </t>
        <t>        
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
    NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
    "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
    described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default"/> 
    when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Scaling Benefits</name>
        <t>Some resource record types are used in a fashion that can create
               scaling problems if an entire RRset associated with a domain
               name is aggregated in the leaf node for that name. An
               increasingly popular approach, with excellent scaling properties,
               places the RRset under a specially named branch, which is in turn
               under the node name that would otherwise contain the RRset. The
               rules for naming that branch define the context for interpreting
               the RRset. That is, rather than: </t>
        <artwork align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[domain-name.example
  /
 RRset
]]></artwork>
        <t> the arrangement is: </t>
        <artwork align="center" name="" type="" alt=""><![CDATA[_branch.domain-name.example
  /
 RRset
]]></artwork>
        <t> A direct lookup to the subordinate leaf node produces
               only the desired record types, at no greater cost than a typical
               DNS lookup.</t>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Global Underscored Node Names</name>
        <t> As defined in <xref target="RFC1034" format="default"/>, the DNS uses names
               organized in a tree-structured or hierarchical fashion. A domain
               name might have multiple node names that begin with
               the underscore character (e.g., "_name"). A global underscored node name is the one that is
               closest to the root of the DNS hierarchy, also called the
               highest level or topmost. In the presentation convention
               described in Section 3.1 of <xref target="RFC1034" format="default"/>, this is the
               rightmost name beginning with an underscore. In other
               presentation environments, it might be positioned differently. To
               avoid concern for the presentation variations, the qualifier
               "global" is used here.</t>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Interaction with DNS Wildcards</name>
        <t>DNS wildcards interact poorly with underscored names in two ways:</t>
        <t>
               Since wildcards are only interpreted as leaf names, one cannot
               create the equivalent of a wildcard name for prefixed names. A
               name such as label.*.example.com is not a wildcard. </t>
        <t>Conversely, a wildcard such as *.example.com can match any name
               including an underscored name. So, a wildcard might match an
               underscored name, returning a record that is the type controlled
               by the underscored name but is not intended to be used in the
               underscored context and does not conform to its rules. </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="history" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>History</name>
        <t> Originally, different uses of underscored node names
               developed largely without coordination. For TXT records, there is
               no consistent, internal syntax that permits distinguishing among
               the different uses. In the case of the SRV RR and URI RR,
               distinguishing among different types of use was part of the
               design (see <xref target="RFC2782" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC7553" format="default"/>). The
               SRV and URI specifications serve as templates, defining RRs that
               might only be used for specific applications when there is an
               additional specification. The template definition included
               reference to two levels of tables of names from which
               underscored names should be drawn. The lower-level (local scope)
               set of <tt>_service</tt> names is defined in
               terms of other IANA tables, namely any table with symbolic names.
               The upper-level (global scope) SRV naming field is
               <tt>_proto</tt>, although its pool of names is
               not explicitly defined. </t>
        <t>The aggregate effect of these independent efforts was a long list
               of underscored names that were reserved without
               coordination, which invites an eventual name-assignment
               collision. The remedy is this base document and a companion document (<xref target="RFC8553" format="default"/>), which define a
               registry for these names and attempt to register all those
               already in use as well as to direct changes to the
               pre-registry specifications that used global underscored
               node names. </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="underfun" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>"Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" Registry</name>
      <t>A registry for global DNS node names that begin with an underscore
         is defined here. The purpose of the 
	 "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry is to
            avoid collisions resulting from the use of the same underscored
            name for different applications. </t>
      <ul empty="true" spacing="normal">
        <li>If a public specification calls for use of an
                  underscored node name, the global underscored
                  node name -- the underscored name that is closest to the DNS root
                  -- MUST be entered into this registry.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>An underscored name defines the scope of use for specific resource
            record types, which are associated with the domain name that is the
            "parent" to the branch defined by the underscored name. A given name
            defines a specific, constrained context for one or more RR TYPEs,
            where use of such record types conforms to the defined constraints.
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>Within a leaf that is underscore scoped, other RRsets that are not
                  specified as part of the scope MAY be used.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>Structurally, the registry is defined as a single, flat table of RR
            TYPEs, under node names beginning with underscore. In some cases,
            such as for use of an SRV record, the full scoping name might be
            multi-part, as a sequence of underscored names. Semantically, that
            sequence represents a hierarchical model, and it is theoretically
            reasonable to allow reuse of a subordinate underscored name in a
            different, global underscored context; that is, a subordinate name
            is meaningful only within the scope of the global underscored node name.
            Therefore, they are ignored by this "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry. This registry is for the definition of highest-level
            -- that is, global -- underscored node name used.</t>
      <table align="center" anchor="Examples">
        <name>Examples of Underscored Names</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="right">NAME</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="right">_service1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="right">_protoB._service2</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="right">_protoB._service3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="right">_protoC._service3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="right">_useX._protoD._service4</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="right">_protoE._region._authority</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>Only global underscored node names are registered in the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry.   From the example above, that would mean _service1, _service2, _service3, _service 4, and _authority would be listed in the IANA registry.
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>The use of underscored node names is specific to each RR TYPE
                  that is being scoped. Each name defines a place but does not
                  define the rules for what appears underneath that place,
                  either as additional underscored naming or as a leaf node with
                  resource records. Details for those rules are provided by
                  specifications for individual RR TYPEs. The sections below
                  describe the way that existing underscored names are used with
                  the RR TYPEs that they name.</li>
        <li>Definition and registration of subordinate underscored node
                  names are the responsibility of the specification that creates
                  the global underscored node name registry entry.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>That is, if a scheme using a global underscored node name has one or
            more subordinate levels of underscored node naming, the namespaces
            from which names for those lower levels are chosen are controlled by
            the parent underscored node name. Each registered global underscored
            node name owns a distinct, subordinate namespace.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Guidance for Registering RRset Use</name>
      <t>  This section provides guidance for specification writers, with a basic template they can use, to register new entries in the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names"
  registry. The text can be added to specifications using
            RR TYPE / _NODE NAME combinations that have not already been
            registered:</t>
      <ul empty="true" spacing="normal">
        <li>Per RFC 8552, please add the following entry to the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry:</li>
      </ul>
      <table align="center" anchor="srventry">
        <name>Template for Entries in the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" Registry</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">RR Type</th>
            <th align="left">_NODE NAME </th>
            <th align="left">Reference</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">{RR TYPE}</td>
            <td align="left">_{DNS global node name}</td>
            <td align="left"> {citation for the document making the addition.}</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA has established the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry.  This section describes the registry, the definitions, the initial entries, the use of_ta and _example, and the use of <xref target="RFC8126" format="default"/> as guidance for expert review. IANA has also updated the "Enumservices Registrations" registry with a pointer to this document.</t>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>"Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" Registry</name>
        <t>The "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry includes any DNS node
               name that begins with the underscore character ("_",
               ASCII 0x5F) and is the underscored node name closest to the root;
               that is, it defines the highest level of a DNS branch under a
               "parent" domain name. </t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>This registry operates under the IANA rules for
                     "Expert Review" registration; see <xref target="ExRev" format="default"/>.</li>
          <li>The contents of each entry in the registry are
                     defined in <xref target="globalregdef" format="default"/>.</li>
          <li>Each entry in the registry MUST contain values for all of
                     the fields specified in <xref target="globalregdef" format="default"/>.</li>
          <li>Within the registry, the combination of RR Type and _NODE
                     NAME MUST be unique.</li>
          <li>The table is to be maintained with entries sorted by the
                     first column (RR Type) and, within that, the second column
                     (_NODE NAME).</li>
          <li>The required Reference for an entry MUST have a stable
                     resolution to the organization controlling that registry
                     entry.</li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="globalregdef" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Contents of an Entry in the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" Registry</name>
          <t>A registry entry contains: </t>
          <ul empty="true" spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <dl newline="false" spacing="normal" indent="12">
                <dt>RR Type:</dt>
                <dd>Lists an RR TYPE that is
                           defined for use within this scope.</dd>
                <dt>_NODE NAME:</dt>
                <dd>Specifies a single,
                           underscored name that defines a reserved name; this
                           name is the global entry name for the scoped
                           resource record types that are associated with that
                           name. For characters in the name that have an
                           uppercase form and a lowercase form, the character
                           MUST be recorded as lowercase to simplify name
                           comparisons. </dd>
                <dt>Reference:</dt>
                <dd>Lists the specification that
                           defines a record type and its use under this _Node
                           Name. The organization producing the specification
                           retains control over the registry entry for the _Node
                           Name.</dd>
              </dl>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t> Each RR TYPE that is to be used with a _Node Name MUST
               have a separate registry entry. </t>
        </section>
        <section numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Initial Node Names</name>
          <t>The initial entries in the registry are as follows:</t>
          <table align="center" anchor="globalunderscore">
            <name>Initial Contents of the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" Registry</name>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">RR Type</th>
                <th align="left">_NODE NAME </th>
                <th align="left">Reference</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">*</td>
                <td align="left">_example</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="_example" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">NULL</td>
                <td align="left">_ta-* {<xref target="_ta" format="default"/>}</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC8145" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">OPENPGPKEY</td>
                <td align="left">_openpgpkey</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC7929" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SMIMEA </td>
                <td align="left">_smimecert</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC8162" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_dccp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC2782" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_http</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC4386" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_ipv6</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC5026" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_ldap</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC4386" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_ocsp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC4386" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_sctp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC2782" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_sip</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC5509" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_tcp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC2782" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_udp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC2782" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SRV</td>
                <td align="left">_xmpp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC3921" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TLSA</td>
                <td align="left">_dane</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC7671" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TLSA</td>
                <td align="left">_sctp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6698" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TLSA</td>
                <td align="left">_tcp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6698" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TLSA</td>
                <td align="left">_udp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6698" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_acme-challenge</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC8555" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_dmarc</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC7489" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_domainkey</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6376" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_mta-sts</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC8461" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_spf</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC7208" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_sztp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="ZEROTOUCH" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_tcp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6763" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_udp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6763" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">TXT</td>
                <td align="left">_vouch</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC5518" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_acct</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_dccp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC7566" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_email</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_ems</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_fax</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_ft</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_h323</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_iax</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_ical-access</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_ical-sched</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_ifax</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_im</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_mms</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_pres</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_pstn</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_sctp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_sip</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_sms</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_tcp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_udp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_unifmsg</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_vcard</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_videomsg</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_voice</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_voicemsg</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_vpim</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_web</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">URI</td>
                <td align="left">_xmpp</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="RFC6118" format="default"/>
                </td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </section>
        <section anchor="_ta" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>_ta</name>
          <t>Under the NULL RR Type, the entry <tt>_ta-*</tt>
               denotes all node names beginning with the string
               <tt>_ta-*</tt>. It does NOT refer to a DNS
            wildcard specification.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="_example" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>_example</name>
          <t>The node name <tt>_example</tt> is reserved
               across all RRsets.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ExRev" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Guidance for Expert Review</name>
          <t>This section provides guidance for expert review of registration
            requests in the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry.</t>
          <ul empty="true" spacing="normal">
            <li>This review is solely to determine adequacy of a requested
                  entry in this registry, and it does not include review of other
                  aspects of the document specifying that entry. For example,
                  such a document might also contain a definition of the
                  resource record type that is referenced by the requested
                  entry. Any required review of that definition is separate from
                  the expert review required here.</li>
          </ul>
          <t> The review is for the purposes of ensuring that:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>The details for creating the registry entry are sufficiently
                  clear, precise, and complete</li>
            <li>The combination of the underscored name, under which the
                  listed resource record type is used, and the resource record
                  type is unique in the table</li>
          </ul>
          <t>For the purposes of this expert review, other matters of the
            specification's technical quality, adequacy, or the like are outside
            of scope. </t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Enumservices Registrations Registry</name>
        <t>The following note has been added to the "Enumservice Registrations" registry:</t>
        <ul empty="true" spacing="normal">
          <li>When adding an entry to this registry, strong
                     consideration should be given to also adding an entry to
                  the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry.</li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This memo raises no security issues.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8461" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8461">
          <front>
            <title>SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8461"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8461"/>
            <author initials="D." surname="Margolis" fullname="D. Margolis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Risher" fullname="M. Risher">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Ramakrishnan" fullname="B. Ramakrishnan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Brotman" fullname="A. Brotman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Jones" fullname="J. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2018" month="September"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) is a mechanism enabling mail service providers (SPs) to declare their ability to receive Transport Layer Security (TLS) secure SMTP connections and to specify whether sending SMTP servers should refuse to deliver to MX hosts that do not offer TLS with a trusted server certificate.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC0952" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc952">
          <front>
            <title>DoD Internet host table specification</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC0952"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="952"/>
            <author initials="K." surname="Harrenstien" fullname="K. Harrenstien">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M.K." surname="Stahl" fullname="M.K. Stahl">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="E.J." surname="Feinler" fullname="E.J. Feinler">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1985" month="October"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This RFC is the official specification of the format of the Internet    Host Table.  This edition of the specification includes minor revisions    to RFC-810 which brings it up to date.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC1034" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034">
          <front>
            <title>Domain names - concepts and facilities</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1034"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
            <author initials="P.V." surname="Mockapetris" fullname="P.V. Mockapetris">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1987" month="November"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This RFC is the revised basic definition of The Domain Name System.  It obsoletes RFC-882.  This memo describes the domain style names and their used for host address look up and electronic mail forwarding.  It discusses the clients and servers in the domain name system and the protocol used between them.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC1035" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035">
          <front>
            <title>Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1035"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
            <author initials="P.V." surname="Mockapetris" fullname="P.V. Mockapetris">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1987" month="November"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This RFC is the revised specification of the protocol and format used in the implementation of the Domain Name System.  It obsoletes RFC-883. This memo documents the details of the domain name client - server communication.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
            <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1997" month="March"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification.  These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents.  This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2181" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181">
          <front>
            <title>Clarifications to the DNS Specification</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2181"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2181"/>
            <author initials="R." surname="Elz" fullname="R. Elz">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="R." surname="Bush" fullname="R. Bush">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1997" month="July"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document considers some areas that have been identified as problems with the specification of the Domain Name System, and proposes remedies for the defects identified. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Cotton" fullname="M. Cotton">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="June"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters.  To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper.  For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed.  This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2782" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2782">
          <front>
            <title>A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2782"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2782"/>
            <author initials="A." surname="Gulbrandsen" fullname="A. Gulbrandsen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Vixie" fullname="P. Vixie">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="L." surname="Esibov" fullname="L. Esibov">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2000" month="February"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a DNS RR which specifies the location of the server(s) for a specific protocol and domain.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3921" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3921">
          <front>
            <title>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3921"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3921"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2004" month="October"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo describes extensions to and applications of the core features of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) that provide the basic instant messaging (IM) and presence functionality defined in RFC 2779.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4386" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4386">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Repository Locator Service</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4386"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4386"/>
            <author initials="S." surname="Boeyen" fullname="S. Boeyen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hallam-Baker" fullname="P. Hallam-Baker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2006" month="February"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) repository locator service.  The service makes use of DNS SRV records defined in accordance with RFC 2782.  The service enables certificate-using systems to locate PKI repositories.This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5026" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5026">
          <front>
            <title>Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping in Split Scenario</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5026"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5026"/>
            <author initials="G." surname="Giaretta" fullname="G. Giaretta" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Kempf" fullname="J. Kempf">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Devarapalli" fullname="V. Devarapalli" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2007" month="October"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Mobile IPv6 node requires a Home Agent address, a home address, and IPsec security associations with its Home Agent before it can start utilizing Mobile IPv6 service.  RFC 3775 requires that some or all of these are statically configured.  This document defines how a Mobile IPv6 node can bootstrap this information from non-topological information and security credentials pre-configured on the Mobile Node.  The solution defined in this document solves the split scenario described in the Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping problem statement in RFC 4640.  The split scenario refers to the case where the Mobile Node's mobility service is authorized by a different service provider than basic network access.  The solution described in this document is also generically applicable to any bootstrapping case, since other scenarios are more specific realizations of the split scenario.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5509" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5509">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Registration of Instant Messaging and Presence DNS SRV RRs for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5509"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5509"/>
            <author initials="S." surname="Loreto" fullname="S. Loreto">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2009" month="April"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document registers with IANA two new DNS SRV protocol labels for resolving Instant Messaging and Presence services with SIP.  [STANDARDS TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5518" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5518">
          <front>
            <title>Vouch By Reference</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5518"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5518"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Levine" fullname="J. Levine">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Hathcock" fullname="A. Hathcock">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2009" month="April"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the Vouch By Reference (VBR) protocol.  VBR is a protocol for adding third-party certification to email.  It permits independent third parties to certify the owner of a domain name that is associated with received mail.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6118" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6118">
          <front>
            <title>Update of Legacy IANA Registrations of Enumservices</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6118"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6118"/>
            <author initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen" fullname="B. Hoeneisen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Mayrhofer" fullname="A. Mayrhofer">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2011" month="March"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document revises all Enumservices that were IANA registered under the now obsolete specification of the Enumservice registry defined in RFC 3761.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6335" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6335"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6335"/>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="165"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Cotton" fullname="M. Cotton">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="L." surname="Eggert" fullname="L. Eggert">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Touch" fullname="J. Touch">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Westerlund" fullname="M. Westerlund">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2011" month="August"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the procedures that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) uses when handling assignment and other requests related to the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number registry.  It also discusses the rationale and principles behind these procedures and how they facilitate the long-term sustainability of the registry.</t>
              <t>This document updates IANA's procedures by obsoleting the previous UDP and TCP port assignment procedures defined in Sections 8 and 9.1 of the IANA Allocation Guidelines, and it updates the IANA service name and port assignment procedures for UDP-Lite, the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), and the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP).  It also updates the DNS SRV specification to clarify what a service name is and how it is registered.  This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6376" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376">
          <front>
            <title>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6376"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6376"/>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="76"/>
            <author initials="D." surname="Crocker" fullname="D. Crocker" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Hansen" fullname="T. Hansen" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Kucherawy" fullname="M. Kucherawy" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2011" month="September"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or organization that owns the signing domain to claim some responsibility for a message by associating the domain with the message.  This can be an author's organization, an operational relay, or one of their agents.  DKIM separates the question of the identity of the Signer of the message from the purported author of the message.  Assertion of responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature and by querying the Signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key.  Message transit from author to recipient is through relays that typically make no substantive change to the message content and thus preserve the DKIM signature.</t>
              <t>This memo obsoletes RFC 4871 and RFC 5672.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6698" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698">
          <front>
            <title>The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6698"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6698"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Schlyter" fullname="J. Schlyter">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2012" month="August"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys used.  This document improves on that situation by enabling the administrators of domain names to specify the keys used in that domain's TLS servers.  This requires matching improvements in TLS client software, but no change in TLS server software.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6763" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763">
          <front>
            <title>DNS-Based Service Discovery</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6763"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6763"/>
            <author initials="S." surname="Cheshire" fullname="S. Cheshire">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Krochmal" fullname="M. Krochmal">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2013" month="February"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies how DNS resource records are named and structured to facilitate service discovery.  Given a type of service that a client is looking for, and a domain in which the client is looking for that service, this mechanism allows clients to discover a list of named instances of that desired service, using standard DNS queries. This mechanism is referred to as DNS-based Service Discovery, or DNS-SD.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7208" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7208">
          <front>
            <title>Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7208"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7208"/>
            <author initials="S." surname="Kitterman" fullname="S. Kitterman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2014" month="April"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Email on the Internet can be forged in a number of ways.  In particular, existing protocols place no restriction on what a sending host can use as the "MAIL FROM" of a message or the domain given on the SMTP HELO/EHLO commands.  This document describes version 1 of the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) protocol, whereby ADministrative Management Domains (ADMDs) can explicitly authorize the hosts that are allowed to use their domain names, and a receiving host can check such authorization.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 4408.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7489" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7489">
          <front>
            <title>Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7489"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7489"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Kucherawy" fullname="M. Kucherawy" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="E." surname="Zwicky" fullname="E. Zwicky" role="editor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="March"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating organization can express domain-level policies and preferences for message validation, disposition, and reporting, that a mail-receiving organization can use to improve mail handling.</t>
              <t>Originators of Internet Mail need to be able to associate reliable and authenticated domain identifiers with messages, communicate policies about messages that use those identifiers, and report about mail using those identifiers.  These abilities have several benefits: Receivers can provide feedback to Domain Owners about the use of their domains; this feedback can provide valuable insight about the management of internal operations and the presence of external domain name abuse.</t>
              <t>DMARC does not produce or encourage elevated delivery privilege of authenticated email.  DMARC is a mechanism for policy distribution that enables increasingly strict handling of messages that fail authentication checks, ranging from no action, through altered delivery, up to message rejection.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7553" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7553">
          <front>
            <title>The Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) DNS Resource Record</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7553"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7553"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Faltstrom" fullname="P. Faltstrom">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="O." surname="Kolkman" fullname="O. Kolkman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="June"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the already registered DNS resource record (RR) type, called the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) RR, that is used for publishing mappings from hostnames to URIs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7566" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7566">
          <front>
            <title>Enumservice Registration for 'acct' URI</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7566"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7566"/>
            <author initials="L." surname="Goix" fullname="L. Goix">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="K." surname="Li" fullname="K. Li">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="June"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document registers an E.164 Number Mapping (ENUM) service for 'acct' URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7671" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671">
          <front>
            <title>The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates and Operational Guidance</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7671"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7671"/>
            <author initials="V." surname="Dukhovni" fullname="V. Dukhovni">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="W." surname="Hardaker" fullname="W. Hardaker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="October"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document clarifies and updates the DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA specification (RFC 6698), based on subsequent implementation experience.  It also contains guidance for implementers, operators, and protocol developers who want to use DANE records.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7929" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7929">
          <front>
            <title>DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Bindings for OpenPGP</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7929"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7929"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Wouters" fullname="P. Wouters">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2016" month="August"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>OpenPGP is a message format for email (and file) encryption that lacks a standardized lookup mechanism to securely obtain OpenPGP public keys.  DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) is a method for publishing public keys in DNS.  This document specifies a DANE method for publishing and locating OpenPGP public keys in DNS for a specific email address using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS resource record.  Security is provided via Secure DNS, however the OPENPGPKEY record is not a replacement for verification of authenticity via the "web of trust" or manual verification.  The OPENPGPKEY record can be used to encrypt an email that would otherwise have to be sent unencrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8145" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8145">
          <front>
            <title>Signaling Trust Anchor Knowledge in DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8145"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8145"/>
            <author initials="D." surname="Wessels" fullname="D. Wessels">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="W." surname="Kumari" fullname="W. Kumari">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="April"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures.  These digital signatures can be verified by building a chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a particular node in the DNS.  This document specifies two different ways for validating resolvers to signal to a server which keys are referenced in their chain of trust.  The data from such signaling allow zone administrators to monitor the progress of rollovers in a DNSSEC-signed zone.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8162" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8162">
          <front>
            <title>Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names for S/MIME</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8162"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8162"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Schlyter" fullname="J. Schlyter">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="May"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how to use secure DNS to associate an S/MIME user's certificate with the intended domain name, similar to the way that DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), RFC 6698, does for TLS.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
            <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="May"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol  specifications.  This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the  defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8555" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8555"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8555"/>
            <author initials="R." surname="Barnes" fullname="R. Barnes">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Hoffman-Andrews" fullname="J. Hoffman-Andrews">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="McCarney" fullname="D. McCarney">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Kasten" fullname="J. Kasten">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2019" month="March"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names.  Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate.  As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms.  This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance.  The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8553" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8553">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Attrleaf Changes: Fixing Specifications That Use Underscored Node Names</title>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8553"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8553"/>
            <author initials="D" surname="Crocker" fullname="Dave Crocker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Original uses of an underscore character as a domain node name prefix, which creates a space for constrained interpretation of resource records, were specified without the benefit of an IANA registry.  This produced an entirely uncoordinated set of name- creation activities, all drawing from the same namespace.  A registry now has been defined.  However the existing specifications that use underscore naming need to be modified, to be in line with the new registry.  This document specifies those changes.  The changes preserve existing software and operational practice, while adapting the specifications for those practices to the newer underscore registry model.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ZEROTOUCH">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)</title>
            <seriesInfo name="Work in Progress," value="draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-29"/>
            <author initials="K" surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M" surname="Abrahamsson" fullname="Mikael Abrahamsson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="I" surname="Farrer" fullname="Ian Farrer">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="January" day="15" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This draft presents a technique to securely provision a networking device when it is booting in a factory-default state.  Variations in the solution enables it to be used on both public and private networks.  The provisioning steps are able to update the boot image, commit an initial configuration, and execute arbitrary scripts to address auxiliary needs.  The updated device is subsequently able to establish secure connections with other systems.  For instance, a device may establish NETCONF (RFC 6241) and/or RESTCONF (RFC 8040) connections with deployment-specific network management systems.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section numbered="false" toc="default">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>Thanks go to Bill Fenner, Dick Franks, Tony Hansen, Martin Hoffmann,
            Paul Hoffman, Peter Koch, Olaf Kolkman, Murray Kucherawy, John
            Levine, Benno Overeinder, and Andrew Sullivan for diligent review of
            the (much) earlier draft versions. For the later enhancements, thanks to
            Stephane Bortzmeyer, Alissa Cooper, Bob Harold, Joel Jaeggli, Benjamin Kaduk,
            Mirja Kuehlewind, Warren Kumari, John Levine, Benno
            Overeinder, Eric Rescorla, Adam Roach, Petr Spacek,
            Ondrej Sury, Paul Vixie, Tim Wicinski, and Paul Wouters.</t>
      <t> Special thanks to Ray Bellis for his persistent encouragement to
            continue this effort, as well as the suggestion for an essential
         simplification to the registration model.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
