From b6841d36205013ccadf933a48c21ab0d5f4a9cfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael S. Tsirkin Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 15:35:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 12/20] usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load RH-Author: Michael S. Tsirkin Message-id: <1399822420-8632-3-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com> Patchwork-id: 58786 O-Subject: [PATCH qemu-kvm RHEL6.6 2/2] usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load Bugzilla: 1096117 RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann RH-Acked-by: Juan Quintela RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek CVE-2013-4541 s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit this to load arbitrary data. setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure they are not negative. Cc: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela (cherry picked from commit 9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a) Bugzilla: 1096117 --- hw/usb-bus.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Jeff E. Nelson --- hw/usb-bus.c | 4 +++- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/usb-bus.c b/hw/usb-bus.c index 9299d5e..5bed692 100644 --- a/hw/usb-bus.c +++ b/hw/usb-bus.c @@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ static int usb_device_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id) } else { dev->attached = 1; } - if (dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) || + if (dev->setup_index < 0 || + dev->setup_len < 0 || + dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) || dev->setup_len >= sizeof(dev->data_buf)) { return -EINVAL; } -- 1.7.1